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Abstract
We consider a monopolist that is selling n items to a single additive buyer, where
the buyer’s values for the items are drawn according to independent distributions
F1, F2, . . . , Fn that possibly have unbounded support. It is well known that —
unlike in the single item case — the revenue-optimal auction (a pricing scheme)
may be complex, sometimes requiring a continuum of menu entries. It is also
known that simple auctions with a finite bounded number of menu entries can
extract a constant fraction of the optimal revenue. Nonetheless, the question of the
possibility of extracting an arbitrarily high fraction of the optimal revenue via a
finite menu size remained open.
In this paper, we give an affirmative answer to this open question, showing that
for every n and for every ε > 0, there exists a complexity bound C = C(n, ε)
such that auctions of menu size at most C suffice for obtaining a (1 − ε) fraction
of the optimal revenue from any F1, . . . , Fn. We prove upper and lower bounds
on the revenue approximation complexity C(n, ε), as well as on the determinis-
tic communication complexity required to run an auction that achieves such an
approximation.
1 Introduction
As familiar economic institutions move to computerized platforms, they are reaching
unprecedented sizes and levels of complexity. These new levels of complexity often become
the defining feature of the computerized economic scenario, as in the cases of spectrum
auctions and ad auctions. The use of the word “complexity” here is intentionally vague,
and can refer to a wide variety of computational, informational, or descriptive measures
of complexity. A high-level goal of the field of “Economics and Computation” is to
analyze such measures of complexity and understand the degree to which they are indeed
a bottleneck to achieving desired economic properties.
This paper studies exactly such a question in the recently well-studied scenario of
pricing multiple items. The scenario is that of a monopolist seller who is selling n items
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to a single additive buyer. The buyer has a private value vi for each item i, where each vi
is distributed according to a commonly known prior distribution Fi, independently of the
values of the other items. The valuation of the buyer is assumed to be additive, so that
her value for a subset S of the items is simply
∑
i∈S vi, and the seller’s goal is to design
an “auction” (really just a a pricing scheme) that maximizes her revenue. The classical
economic analysis (Myerson, 1981) shows that for a single item, the optimal auction is
simply to sell the item at some fixed price. On the other hand, when there is more
than a single item, it is known that the optimal auction may be surprisingly complex,
randomized, and unintuitive (McAfee and McMillan, 1988; Thanassoulis, 2004; Manelli
and Vincent, 2006; Giannakopoulos and Koutsoupias, 2014, 2015; Hart and Reny, 2015;
Daskalakis et al., 2013).
A significant amount of recent work has studied whether “simple” auctions may yield
at least an approximately optimal revenue. Following a sequence of results (Chawla et al.,
2010; Hart and Nisan, 2012; Li and Yao, 2013), it was shown by Babaioff et al. (2014)
that one of the following two “simple” auctions always yields at least a constant fraction
(1/6) of the optimal revenue: either sell all items as a single take-it-or-leave-it bundle (for
some carefully chosen price) or sell each item separately for its Myerson price. This was
further extended (with different constants) to the case of multiple buyers (Yao, 2015)
and to buyers with sub-additive valuations (Rubinstein and Weinberg, 2015), but is in
contrast to the case where the item values are distributed according to a joint (correlated)
distribution, a case for which no finite approximation is possible by finite auctions (Briest
et al., 2010; Hart and Nisan, 2013).
In this work, we study the trade-off between the complexity of an auction and the
extent to which it can approximate the optimal revenue. One may choose various mea-
sures of auction complexity (Hart and Nisan, 2013; Dughmi et al., 2014; Morgenstern
and Roughgarden, 2015), and we will focus on the simplest one, the menu size suggested
in Hart and Nisan (2013). The menu size of an auction (for a single buyer, an auction is
just a pricing scheme) is defined to be the number of different possible outcomes of the
auction. More specifically, every single-buyer auction is equivalent to one that offers a
menu of options to the buyer, where each option — entry (~x; p) — in the menu specifies a
probability xi of acquiring each item i as well as a price p to be paid for the combination
~x, and the buyer chooses an entry that maximizes her own expected utility
∑
i xi · vi− p.
The number of entries in the menu is defined to be the menu-size complexity of the auc-
tion. The logarithm of the menu size is exactly equal to the deterministic communication
complexity of the auction: the auction is considered common knowledge, and the buyer,
who knows her private values, must send enough information (see Appendix A for a for-
mal definition) to the seller so that the outcome (allocation probabilities and price) of the
auction for these values can be determined.1 It is known that for some distributions, the
optimal auction has infinite menu size (Daskalakis et al., 2013) but a constant fraction
of the optimal revenue may be extracted by a finite-complexity auction (Babaioff et al.,
2014). Is it possible to extract an arbitrarily high fraction of the optimal revenue via a
finite menu size?
Our first and main result shows that, in fact, finite complexity suffices to get arbitrarily
close to the optimal revenue.
1Since the seller has no private information in our setting, an arbitrary interactive protocol between
the buyer and the seller must use at least as many bits as this one-way communication. Thus, this notion
captures general two-way deterministic complexity as well. See Appendix A for more details, as well as
a discussion regarding randomized communication complexity.
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Definition 1.1 (RevC ; Rev). For a distribution F on n items, we denote by RevC(F )
the maximal (formally, the supremum) revenue obtainable by an individually rational
incentive-compatible auction that has at most C menu entries and sells the n items to
a single additive buyer whose values for the items are distributed according to F . We
denote by Rev(F ) = Rev∞(F ) the maximal revenue obtainable without any complexity
restrictions on the auction.
Formally, our result shows that limC→∞
RevC(F )
Rev(F ) = 1 uniformly across all product
distributions F . In other words:
Theorem 1.1 (Qualitative Version). For every number of items n and every ε > 0, there
exists a finite menu size C = C(n, ε) such that for every F1, F2, . . . , Fn ∈ ∆(R+), we have
that RevC(F1 × · · · × Fn) ≥ (1− ε) · Rev(F1 × · · · × Fn).
Theorem 1.1 gives a positive answer to Open Problem 6 from Hart and Nisan (2014),2
which asks precisely whether the statement of Theorem 1.1 holds. It is natural to ask
what is the rate of the uniform convergence of the sequence RevC(F )Rev(F ) . In other words, how
complex must a revenue-approximating auction be?
Definition 1.2 (Revenue Approximation Complexity). For every number of items n and
every ε > 0, we define the revenue approximation complexity C(n, ε) ∈ R+ to be the
smallest value C ∈ R+ such that RevC(F1 × · · · × Fn) ≥ (1− ε) · Rev(F1 × · · · × Fn) for
every F1, F2, . . . , Fn ∈ ∆(R+).
The construction used in the proof of Theorem 1.1 gives an upper bound on C(n, ε)
(i.e., a lower bound on the rate of uniform convergence of RevC(F )Rev(F ) ).
Theorem 1.1 (Quantitative Version3). C(n, ε) ≤ (n/ε)O(n).
Corollary 1.2. For every number of items n, every ε > 0, and every F1, F2, . . . , Fn ∈
∆(R+), there exists an n-item auction with a deterministic communication complexity of
only logC(n, ε) = O
(
n log(n/ε)
)
that approximates the optimal revenue from F1×· · ·×Fn
up to a multiplicative ε loss.
This bound on the menu size is exponential in n, and so the next natural question is
whether polynomial menu size suffices. At first glance the answer seems to be “obviously
not”: the menu-size complexity measure is quite weak, and even the auction that sells
each item separately has exponential menu size (since, when presented as a menu, a menu
entry is needed for each possible subset of the items). This answer, however, is premature;
in fact, we show that polynomial menu size turns out to suffice for approximating the
revenue obtainable from selling items separately. Let us denote by SRev(F1 × · · · × Fn)
the revenue obtainable by selling each item separately for its optimal price.
Theorem 1.3. For every ε > 0, there exists d(ε) such that for every number of items n
and F1, F2, . . . , Fn ∈ ∆(R+), we have for C = nd(ε) that RevC(F1 × · · · × Fn) ≥ (1− ε) ·
SRev(F1 × · · · × Fn).
The same bound applies also to the revenue obtainable by selling the items after
arbitrarily prepartitioning them into bundles. Using the result of Babaioff et al. (2014),
this immediately implies that polynomial menu size suffices for extracting a constant
fraction of the optimal revenue.
2Hart and Nisan (2014) is a manuscript combining Hart and Nisan (2012) and Hart and Nisan (2013).
3A more careful analysis can in fact show that C(n, ε) ≤ (logn/ε)O(n). See Section 2.7 for more details.
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Corollary 1.4. There exist a fixed constant number d and a fixed constant fraction α > 0
such that C(n, 1− α) ≤ O(nd).
The above reasoning shows that Corollary 1.4 holds for every α arbitrarily close to 1/6,
which is the constant fraction of the optimal revenue shown by Babaioff et al. (2014) to
be obtainable by the better of bundled selling and separate selling.
Does polynomial menu size suffice for extracting revenue arbitrarily close to the opti-
mal revenue? We prove that this is not the case, at least for ε that is polynomially small
in n.
Theorem 1.5. C(n, 1/n) ≥ 2Ω(n).
The proof of Theorem 1.5 shows, in fact, that polynomial dependence on ε is impossible
even for approximating the revenue from selling the items separately.
At this point, we leave two main problems open. The first one is whether for every
fixed ε > 0, polynomial (or at least quasi-polynomial) menu size suffices for approximating
the optimal revenue to within a multiplicative ε. In terms of communication complexity,
this translates to whether logarithmic or polylogarithmic deterministic communication
suffices4 for every fixed value of ε.
Open Problem 1.6. Is it true that for every ε > 0, there exists d(ε) such that C(n, ε) ≤
O
(
nd(ε)
)
? How about C(n, ε) ≤ O(2logd(ε) n)?
The second open problem (or rather, class of open problems) is whether stronger
notions of auction description complexity may allow for better revenue in polynomial
complexity. This may be asked with respect to any complexity measure, and it is not
clear which specific natural choice to consider, so an identification of such a measure is
part of what is left open.5
2 Upper Bound on
Revenue-Approximation Complexity
In this section, we prove our main result, Theorem 1.1, which states that C(n, ε) is finite
for every number of items n ∈ N and ε > 0, and moreover, that C(n, ε) ≤ (n/ε)O(n). The
proof proceeds in four steps. Section 2.1 provides a rough overview of the proof strategy,
Sections 2.3 through 2.6 provide the formal details of each of the four steps of the proof,
and Section 2.7 connects the dots by combining the four steps. Finally, Section 2.8
concludes with a short discussion of the application of the proof steps to obtain uniform
approximation results for correlated distributions over a restricted valuation space, which
generalize bounded distributions.
4The authors have opposing conjectures regarding the answer to this open problem.
5One may be tempted to consider the additive menu size complexity defined by Hart and Nisan
(2013), which allows the seller to present menus from which the buyer is allowed to take any combination
of menu entries for the sum of their prices. However, this notion is not well defined for lottery pricing
except when we disallow overlaps in the specification of menu entries, a restriction that brings us back
to a prepartitioning of the items, a lower bound for which is already implied by Theorem 1.3. There are
several possible more general definitions, but we have not found a truly satisfactory one.
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2.1 Proof Overview
Let F1, F2, . . . , Fn be the respective distributions of the values of the n items. We will con-
struct an auction with (finite) menu size (n/ε)O(n) that guarantees a (1− ε) multiplicative
approximation to the optimal revenue.
Limitations of Existing Techniques One possible approach to approximate revenue
maximization, taken by Li and Yao (2013), Babaioff et al. (2014), and Rubinstein and
Weinberg (2015), is to use a core/tail decomposition and bound the revenue from (or the
welfare of) the core and the revenue from the tail. Unfortunately, such a decomposition
inherently entails a nonnegligible revenue loss (it only guarantees a constant fraction
of the optimal revenue), either due to bounding the welfare of the core instead of the
revenue from it, or due to estimating the total revenue using the revenues obtained by
selling to the core and to the tail separately. Therefore, while this approach makes no
assumptions regarding the valuation space (beyond independence), this technique, as
used in the literature so far, is unsuitable for guaranteeing negligible loss in revenue as
in the result that we seek.
Another possible approach, taken by Daskalakis and Weinberg (2012), Hart and Nisan
(2013), and Dughmi et al. (2014), is to round all possible menu entries onto a discrete grid
via “nudge and round” operations. Unfortunately, for the grid (and thus the menu size)
to be finite and for the revenue loss to indeed be negligible, the above papers all require
that the valuation space be bounded. Therefore, while this approach can guarantee
negligible loss in revenue, this technique, as used in the literature so far, is unsuitable for
the analysis of unbounded valuation spaces as in as in our setting.
To overcome the above-described limitations of the core/tail decomposition technique,
we take a more subtle approach, by analyzing core and tail regions together. We first
show (in Step 1 below) that one does not lose much revenue by disregarding what can
be described as “second-order” tails, i.e., valuations where two or more of the item prices
lie in the tail. Then, we show how to gradually simplify an optimal auction (which may
be arbitrarily complex, even infinite in size) for the valuation space consisting of the core
plus all first-order tails while losing only a tiny fraction of the revenue in each step. For
every modification that we perform to the menu, we must “simultaneously” check that
we do not significantly hurt the revenue from either core or (first-order) tail buyers. To
gradually simplify the menu, we first carefully modify the menu so that only a small
number of menu entries have a high price (this is the most technically elaborate part of
the proof, performed in Steps 2 and 3 below), and then (in Step 4 below) round the menu
entries with low prices to a finite grid using “nudge and round” operations. At this point,
the use of “nudge and round” onto a finite grid is possible without significant revenue
loss since the price of the menu entries that we round is bounded. Nonetheless, care still
has to be taken beyond previous “nudge and round” uses, to ensure that this rounding
does not incentivize buyers in the (first-order) tails to switch to buying a lower-priced
rounded entry. Before moving on to the definitions and formal statements and proof, we
first give a somewhat more detailed, yet still high-level, overview of each of the four steps
of the proof.
Step 1: Move to an “almost bounded” valuation space This step, taken in Sec-
tion 2.3, simplifies the valuation space by showing that since item prices are independent,
finding an approximately optimal auction under the assumption that at most one item has
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a price higher than H (i.e., has a price that lies in the H-tail), for some H = poly(n, 1/ε),
entails a very small loss compared to doing so without this assumption. This is possible,
very roughly speaking, because the probability of two item prices lying in the tail, for
H as above, can be thought of as being of order ε2, while the revenue conditioned upon
being in this “second-order” tail (i.e., conditioned upon the prices of both of these items
lying in the H-tail) is of order 1/ε. Therefore, it is enough to construct our finite approx-
imation for the distribution conditioned upon being in the valuation space comprised of
the core and the first-order tail, i.e., the valuation space where at most one item price
lies in the tail. We call distributions over this valuation space exclusively unbounded
distributions. We note that this is the only step in which the independence of the item
prices is used; indeed, combining the remaining steps shows that the revenue from all
exclusive unbounded distributions (even highly correlated distributions not originating
from a product distribution over Rn+) can be uniformly approximated using finite-size
menus (see Proposition 2.6 in Section 2.8).
Step 2: Modify expensive menu items to behave “almost like” single-item
auctions This step, taken in Section 2.4, starts with an optimal (possibly arbitrarily
complex) revenue-maximizing auction for some exclusively unbounded distribution. In
this step, we simplify the “expensive” part of the menu, i.e., the part of the menu con-
sisting of all menu entries that cost more than E, for some E = poly(n, 1/ε), so that each
expensive menu entry allocates only a single item with non-zero probability. This means
that while in the “cheap” part of the menu we can allocate arbitrary combinations of
items, once the price increases beyond E, our auction must act like a unit-demand one
and never allocate more than a single item. We call such an auction E-exclusive. This
is possible since, roughly speaking, due to the assumption of exclusive unboundedness,
most of the value from an expensive menu entry chosen by some buyer type comes only
from the unique item whose price lies in the tail for the valuation of that buyer type.
Thus, instead of offering that (nonexclusive) menu entry, we offer an (exclusive) entry
with only the corresponding winning probability of that item, for a slightly discounted
price. While in most natural cases, this step in fact increases the size of the expensive
part of the menu (as each expensive menu entry possibly becomes n exclusive menu en-
tries, each allocating a distinct item with non-zero probability), this simplification allows
the next step to significantly reduce the size of this part of the menu.
Step 3: Apply Myerson’s result to obtain “almost one” expensive entry per
item This step, taken in Section 2.5, reduces the size of the expensive part of the
menu to at most 2n menu entries. This is the most technically elaborate step. Since E-
exclusivity means that the expensive auction entries “look like” separate auctions for each
of the n items, we show that we are able to carefully use the analysis of Myerson (1981)
to replace each of these separate expensive auctions with a simple “almost deterministic”
one. In contrast to Myerson’s single (non-zero) menu entry, we require two menu entries
for each item: a deterministic one analogous to Myerson’s “optimal price” entry, and an
additional randomized one analogous to the “opt out” zero entry in Myerson’s auction.
The function of the latter entry is to make sure that buyers are not incentivized to “jump”
from the expensive part to the cheap part of the menu following the reduction of the size
of the former.
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Step 4: Discretize cheap menu entries “almost to a grid” This final step, taken
in Section 2.6, simplifies the cheap part of the menu by “rounding” the menu entries
into a discrete set. We note that even at this point in the proof, the “nudge and round”
techniques that allowed this rounding to be done with only negligible loss of revenue
for bounded valuations in previous papers (Daskalakis and Weinberg, 2012; Hart and
Nisan, 2013; Dughmi et al., 2014) cannot just be used “out of the box” in this step.
Indeed, slight changes in allocation probabilities may result in large revenue changes,
since the valuation space is not bounded but only exclusively unbounded. Nonetheless,
these techniques can be carefully extended to be used here as well. Roughly speaking, we
construct n discretizations of each cheap menu entry, where each discretization rounds the
price and all but one allocation; rounding in the right direction guarantees that at least
one of these discretizations is still a leading candidate for any buyer type that previously
chose the corresponding original (nondiscretized) menu entry. As all but one coordinate
of each of the discretized menu entries lie on a grid, we show that only finitely many of
the menu entries are in fact chosen by any buyer type.
While the second and third (and first) steps each entail a slight multiplicative revenue
drop, the fourth step entails also a slight additive revenue drop. Recall, however, that
we aim to achieve only a slight multiplicative drop (with no additional additive drop)
in overall revenue. To obtain this result, when combining all of the above steps in Sec-
tion 2.7 we assume w.l.o.g. that MaxiRev(Fi) is normalized6 (by scaling the currency)
to a suitable value such that the additive drop in the fourth step can be quantified to
be less than a slight multiplicative drop. Clearly, as the obtained bound on the overall
cumulative revenue drop for normalized auctions is purely multiplicative, the proof also
implies the same multiplicative bound for all (even nonnormalized) distributions.
2.2 Preliminaries
Definition 2.1 (Notation).
• (Naturals). We denote the strictly positive natural numbers by N , {1, 2, 3, . . .}.
• ([n]). For every n ∈ N, we define [n] , {1, 2, . . . , n}.
• (Nonnegative Reals). We denote the nonnegative reals by R+ , {r ∈ R | r ≥ 0}.
Definition 2.2 (Outcome; Type; Utility). Let n ∈ N be a number of items.
a. An outcome is an (n + 1)-tuple (~x; p) = (x1, x2, . . . , xn; p) ∈ [0, 1]n × R+, denoting
an allocation (to the buyer) of every item i ∈ [n] with probability xi, for a total
price (paid by the buyer) of p.
b. We denote the (expected) utility of a (risk-neutral additive) buyer with type (re-
spective item valuations) v = (v1, v2, . . . , vn) ∈ Rn+ from an outcome e = (~x; p) ∈
[0, 1]n × R+ by
ue(v) ,
n∑
i=1
xi · vi − p.
6The cases in which MaxiRev(Fi) cannot be normalized, i.e., when it is 0 or infinite, are easy to
handle separately. In the former case, there is nothing to show. In the latter case, Rev(Fi) = ∞ for
some i ∈ [n], and so by the theorem of Myerson (1981), an arbitrarily high revenue can be extracted
using a take-it-or-leave-it offer for item i.
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Definition 2.3 (IC Auction as Menu). Let n ∈ N be a number of items. By the taxation
principle, we identify any incentive-compatible (IC) n-item auction with a (possibly in-
finitely large) menu of outcomes (the entries in the menu are all the possible outcomes of
the auction), where by IC the buyer chooses an entry that maximizes her utility.7 If the
auction is individually rational (IR), then we assume w.l.o.g. that the menu includes the
entry (~0; 0) that allocates no item and costs nothing. (Conversely, if the menu includes
the entry (~0; 0), then the auction is IR.) Following Hart and Nisan (2013), we define the
menu size of an IC and IR auction as the number of entries, except (~0; 0), in the menu
of that auction.
Definition 2.4 (RevM; RevC ; Rev). Let n ∈ N be a number of items and let F ∈ ∆(Rn+)
be a distribution over Rn+.
a. Given an IC and IR n-item auctionM, we denote the (expected) revenue obtainable
byM from (a single risk-neutral additive buyer with type distributed according to)
F , by
RevM(F ) , Ev∼F
[
p(v)
]
,
where p(v) is the price of the entry from M that maximizes the utility of v, with
ties broken in favor of higher prices.8,9
b. Given C ∈ N, we denote the highest revenue (more accurately, the supremum of
the revenues) obtainable from F by an IC and IR n-item auction with at most C
menu entries by
RevC(F ) , sup
M⊆[0,1]n×R+:
|M|≤C
RevM(F ).
c. We denote the highest revenue (more accurately, the supremum of the revenues)
obtainable from F by an IC and IR n-item auction by
Rev(F ) , sup
M⊆[0,1]n×R+
RevM(F ).
Theorem 2.1 (Hart and Nisan, 2012). Rev(F ×G) ≤ 2 · (Rev(F ) +Rev(G)), for every
m,n ∈ N, F ∈ ∆(Rm+ ), and G ∈ ∆(Rn+).
2.3 At Most One High Price
As outlined above, our first step toward proving Theorem 1.1, which we take in this
section, simplifies the valuation space by showing that since item prices are independent,
7If the menu is infinite, then the fact that it corresponds to an IC auction guarantees that some menu
entry maximizes the utility of each buyer type. See Appendix B.1.1 for more details.
8The results of this paper hold regardless of the tie-breaking rule chosen. See Appendix B.2 for more
details.
9If the menu is infinite, then the fact that a utility-maximizing menu entry exists for every buyer type
does not guarantee that a utility-maximizing entry with maximal price (among all utility-maximizing
entries) exists for every buyer type. (I.e., it is not guaranteed that the supremum price over all utility-
maximizing entries is attained as a maximum.) Indeed, to be completely general, a more subtle definition
of the revenue obtainable by an IC auction would have been needed. Nonetheless, for the auctions
considered in this paper, this subtle definition is not required as we make sure that they all possess, for
each buyer type, a utility-maximizing entry with maximal price. See Appendix B.1.2 for more details.
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any auction that extracts most of the revenue under the assumption that the valuation
space is restricted to some H-exclusively unbounded valuation space, i.e., to a valuation
space where for each buyer type at most one item has price higher than some H =
poly(n, 1/ε), also extracts most of the revenue without this assumption. This step is
formalized by Lemma 2.2.
Definition 2.5 (EUnH ; Exclusively Unbounded Type Distribution). Let H ∈ R+ and
n ∈ N.
a. We denote the subset of Rn+ where at most one coordinate is greater than H by
EUnH ,
{
(v1, v2, . . . , vn) ∈ Rn+
∣∣ |{i ∈ [n] | vi > H}| ≤ 1}.
b. We say that a type distribution F ∈ ∆(Rn+) is (H-)exclusively unbounded if
supp(F ) ⊆ EUnH .
Definition 2.6 (F |A). For a set A and a distribution F defined over some superset of
A s.t. A is measurable and F (A) > 0, we denote the conditional distribution of v ∼ F
conditioned upon v ∈ A by F |A. Formally, for every measurable set B ⊆ A, we define
F |A(B) , F (B)F (A) .
Lemma 2.2. Let n ∈ N s.t. n ≥ 2, let R ∈ R+, let ε ∈ (0, 1), and let H ≥ 2·n·(n−1)·Rε . For
every F = F1 × F2 × · · · × Fn ∈ ∆(R+)n s.t. Maxi∈[n]Rev(Fi) ≤ R, all of the following
hold.
a. F (EUnH) > 0 (hence the exclusively unbounded conditioned distribution F |EUnH is
well defined).
b. Rev(F |EUnH ) ≥ (1− ε) · Rev(F ).
c. For every a ∈ (0, 1] and for every IC and IR n-item auctionM, if RevM(F |EUnH ) ≥
a · Rev(F |EUnH ), then RevM(F ) ≥ (1− ε) · a · Rev(F ).
Proof. For every i ∈ [n], we denote the probability of v ∼ Fi being greater than H by
pi , Fi
(
(H,∞)). We first note that
pi ≤ ε
2 · n · (n− 1) (1)
for every i ∈ [n]. Indeed, the revenue from Fi of the auction selling (item i) for a take-
it-or-leave-it price of H is at least H · pi, and by definition of Rev we therefore have
H · pi ≤ Rev(Fi) ≤ R and so pi ≤ R/H ≤ ε2·n·(n−1) , as claimed. In particular, since ε < 1,
we note that this implies that Fi([0, H]) = 1 − pi > 0 and so, since EUnH ⊃ [0, H]n, we
obtain that F (EUnH) ≥ (1− pi)n > 0, proving Part a. (Thus, F |EUnH is well defined.) For
the proof of Parts b and c, we will need the following sublemma.
Sublemma 2.2.1. Let n ∈ N and let F ∈ ∆(Rn+).
a. F (B) · Rev(F |B) ≤ F (A) · Rev(F |A) for every10 B ⊆ A ⊆ Rn+.
10If F (C) = 0 for some C ⊆ Rn+, then even though F |C is not defined, we henceforth define F (C) ·
Rev(F |C) to equal 0.
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b. For every m ∈ N and every A1, A2, . . . , Am ⊆ Rn+ s.t.
⋃m
i=1Am = Rn+, we have that
Rev(F ) ≤∑mi=1 F (Ai) · Rev(F |Ai).
The proof of Sublemma 2.2.1 is given after the proof of Lemma 2.2. We now proceed
to prove Parts b and c of Lemma 2.2. We note that for every i ∈ [n], if pi > 0, then
Rev(Fi|(H,∞)) ≤ Rev(Fi)/pi. (2)
Indeed, by Sublemma 2.2.1(a), we have that pi · Rev(Fi|(H,∞)) ≤ Rev(Fi), and so
Rev(Fi|(H,∞)) ≤ Rev(Fi)/pi, as required.
For every 1 ≤ i < j ≤ n, we let Bi,j ,
{
(v1, v2, . . . , vn) ∈ Rn+
∣∣ vi > H & vj > H}
(the “double-tail” w.r.t. i and j) and pi,j , F (Bi,j) = pi · pj. We claim that
pi,j · Rev(F |Bi,j) ≤
ε(
n
2
) · Rev(F ), (3)
for every 1 ≤ i < j ≤ n. Since the claim trivially holds when pi,j = 0, we need only prove
it when pi > 0 and pj > 0. In this case, by Theorem 2.1 (applied twice) and by Eqs. (1)
and (2), we have
pi,j · Rev(F |Bi,j) = pi,j · Rev
(
Fi|(H,∞) × Fj|(H,∞) × ×
k∈[n]\{i,j}
Fk
)
≤
≤ 4 · pi,j ·
(
Rev(Fi|(H,∞))+Rev(Fj|(H,∞))+Rev( ×
k∈[n]\{i,j}
Fk
)) ≤
≤ 4 · pi,j ·
(
Rev(Fi)
pi
+
Rev(Fj)
pj
+Rev( ×
k∈[n]\{i,j}
Fk
))
=
= 4 ·
(
pj · Rev
(
Fi
)
+ pi · Rev
(
Fj
)
+ pi · pj · Rev
( ×
k∈[n]\{i,j}
Fk
)) ≤
≤ 4 · ε
2 · n · (n− 1)
(
Rev(Fi)+Rev(Fj)+Rev( ×
k∈[n]\{i,j}
Fk
)) ≤
≤ 2 · ε
n · (n− 1) · Rev(F ) =
ε(
n
2
) · Rev(F ),
as claimed.
We define pEU , F (EUnH). As Rn+ \ EUnH =
⋃
1≤i<j≤nBi,j, by Sublemma 2.2.1(b) we
have that Rev(F ) ≤ pEU ·Rev(F |EUnH )+
∑
1≤i<j≤n pi,j ·Rev(F |Bi,j). Therefore, by Eq. (3),
we have that
pEU · Rev(F |EUnH ) ≥ Rev(F )−
∑
1≤i<j≤n
pi,j · Rev(F |Bi,j) ≥
≥ Rev(F )−
(
n
2
)
· ε(n
2
) · Rev(F ) = (1− ε) · Rev(F ). (4)
In particular, Rev(F |EUnH ) ≥ pEU · Rev(F |EUnH ) ≥ (1− ε) · Rev(F ), proving Part b.
Let a ∈ (0, 1] and let M be an IC and IR n-item auction with RevM(F |EUnH ) ≥
a · Rev(F |EUnH ). By definition of Rev and by Eq. (4), we have that
RevM(F ) = pEU · RevM(F |EUnH ) + (1− pEU) · RevM(F |Rn+\EUnH ) ≥
≥ pEU · RevM(F |EUnH ) ≥ pEU · a · Rev(F |EUnH ) ≥ a · (1− ε) · Rev(F ),
proving Part c.
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Proof of Sublemma 2.2.1. For Part a, if F (B) = 0 then there is nothing to prove, so we
assume henceforth that F (B) > 0. Therefore, also F (A) ≥ F (B) > 0 and thus F |A and
F |A|B = F |B are well defined. We begin by noting that Rev(F |A) ≥ F |A(B) · Rev(F |B).
Indeed, this inequality holds since for any auctionM (in particular, any auction obtaining
close to optimal revenue from F |B), we have RevM(F |A) ≥ F |A(B) · RevM(F |B); by
definition of Rev, the inequality follows. Therefore, we have that F (A) · Rev(F |A) ≥
F (A) · F |A(B) · Rev(F |B) = F (B) · Rev(F |B), as required.
For Part b, we start by defining Bi , Ai \
⋃i−1
j=1Aj. By definition, (Bi)
m
i=1 is a
partition of Rn+. We first claim that Rev(F ) ≤
∑m
i=1 F (Bi) · Rev(F |Bi). Indeed, for any
auction M (in particular, any auction obtaining close to optimal revenue from F ), we
have that RevM(F ) =
∑m
i=1 F (Bi) · RevM(F |Bi);11 by definition of Rev, the inequality
follows. By Part a, we have that F (Bi) · Rev(F |Bi) ≤ F (Ai) · Rev(F |Ai) for every i ∈
[m]. Combining both of these, we obtain that Rev(F ) ≤ ∑mi=1 F (Bi) · Rev(F |Bi) ≤∑m
i=1 F (Ai) · Rev(F |Ai), as required.
2.4 Exclusivity at Expensive Menu Entries
Having proven Lemma 2.2, we phrase and prove the next steps for arbitrary exclu-
sively unbounded distributions, i.e., not necessarily product distributions conditioned
upon EUnH . As outlined above, our second step toward proving Theorem 1.1, which we
take in this section, shows that in any auction over some exclusively unbounded distri-
bution, the “expensive” part of the menu, i.e., the part of the menu consisting of all
menu entries that cost more than some E = poly(n, 1/ε), can be simplified without signif-
icant loss in revenue to make the auction E-exclusive, i.e., to make each expensive menu
entry only allocate a single item with non-zero probability. This step is formalized by
Lemma 2.3.
Definition 2.7 (Exclusive Auction). Let n ∈ N and let E ∈ R+. We say that an n-item
auction is E-exclusive if it allocates (with positive probability) at most one item whenever
it charges strictly more than E.12
Lemma 2.3. Let n ∈ N s.t. n ≥ 2, let H ∈ R+, let ε ∈ (0, 1), and set E , 4·(n−1)·Hε2 .
For every F ∈ ∆(EUnH) and for every IC and IR n-item auction M, there exists an
E-exclusive IC and IR n-item auction M′ such that RevM′(F ) ≥ (1− ε) · RevM(F ).
Proof. Set ε˜ , ε/2. We construct a new IC and IR auction M′ as follows:
• For every menu entry e = (~x; p) ∈ M with p ≤ E, we add the menu entry e,
unmodified, to M′.
• For every menu entry e = (~x; p) ∈ M with p > E, we add the following13 n menu
entries to M′: (x1,~0−1; (1− ε˜) · p), (x2,~0−2; (1− ε˜) · p),· · · ,(xn,~0−n; (1− ε˜) · p).
Each of these menu entries is a modified version of e that completely “unallocates”
all but one of the items, while giving a slight multiplicative price discount of (1− ε˜).
11Similarly, if F (Bi) = 0 for some i ∈ [n], then we define F (Bi) · RevM(F |Bi) to equal 0.
12While this also implies that the allocated item is quite expensive, and therefore some may say
“exclusive,” the exclusivity discussed in the definition is that of solely this specific item being sold.
13Following standard notation, we use (y′, ~y−i; q), for ~y ∈ [0, 1]n, i ∈ [n], y′ ∈ [0, 1], and q ∈ R+, to
denote the outcome (y1, . . . , yi−1, y′, yi+1, . . . , yn; q), i.e., an outcome that is identical to (~y; q) in price
and all winning probabilities, except the winning probability of item i, which is set to y′.
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Finally, we define M′ to be the closure of the set of menu entries added above to M′.14
By definition, M′ is E-exclusive. We note that since M is IR, it contains the menu
entry (~0; 0). Therefore, M′ also contains this menu entry, and hence M′ is IR as well.
It remains to show that M′ obtains a revenue of at least (1 − ε) · RevM(F ) from F .
Let us compare the payments that M′ and M extract from a buyer of each type v =
(v1, v2, . . . , vn) ∈ EUnH . We reason by cases according to the menu entry of choice15 of
buyer type v from M, which we denote by e = (~x; p), and show that in either case, the
payment extracted from a buyer of type v decreases by at most a multiplicative factor of
(1− 2ε˜) in M′ compared to M.
• If p ≤ E, then by definition e ∈M′. We claim that v weakly prefers e to all menu
entries f ′ = (~y′; q′) ∈M′ with16 q′ < (1− ε˜) · p. Indeed, for every such menu entry
f ′, we have that q′ < (1− ε˜) ·E, and so by definition we have that f ′ ∈M, and so
by definition of e we have that v weakly prefers e to f ′. Therefore, the price of the
menu entry chosen by v fromM′ is at least (1− ε˜) ·p, and so the payment extracted
from a buyer of type v decreases by at most a multiplicative factor of (1− ε˜) inM′
compared to M.
• Otherwise, i.e., if p > E, then since E > n · H (since n ≥ 2 and ε < 1), by IR
there must exist i ∈ [n] s.t. vi > H. Since v ∈ EUnH , we have that vk ≤ H for
every k ∈ [n] \ {i}. Let e′ = (~x′; p′) , (xi,~0−i; (1− ε˜) · p) be the menu entry inM′
corresponding to e that unallocates all items except item i. We claim that v weakly
prefers e′ to all menu entries f ′ = (~y′; q′) ∈M′ with17 q′ < p′ − (1−ε˜)·(n−1)·H
ε˜
. Let f ′
be such a menu entry and denote the menu entry corresponding to f ′ in M by
f = (~y; q) (where either f ′ = f or f ′ = (yj,~0−j, (1− ε˜) · q) for some j ∈ [n]). Noting
that q ≤ q′
1−ε˜ < p− (n−1)·Hε˜ , we indeed get
ue′(v) = x
′
i · vi − p′ = xi · vi − p+ ε˜ · p ≥ −(n− 1) ·H +
n∑
k=1
xk · vk − p+ ε˜ · p =
= −(n− 1) ·H + ue(v) + ε˜ · p ≥ −(n− 1) ·H + uf (v) + ε˜ · p =
= −(n−1)·H+
n∑
k=1
yk ·vk−q+ε˜·p > −(n−1)·H+
n∑
k=1
yk ·vk−q+ε˜·
(
q + (n−1)·H
ε˜
)
=
= −(n− 1) ·H +
n∑
k=1
yk · vk − q · (1− ε˜) + (n− 1) ·H ≥
n∑
k=1
yk · vk − q′ ≥
≥
n∑
k=1
y′k · vk − q′ = uf ′(v).
Therefore, the payment that M′ extracts from a buyer of type v is at least
14Taking the closure ensures that a utility-maximizing entry with maximal price exists for every buyer
type. See Appendix B.1 for more details.
15If more than one utility-maximizing menu entry with maximal price exists, then here and whenever
we henceforth refer to the “menu entry of choice” of some buyer type, we choose one such entry arbitrarily.
16As we show weak preference and as q′ is defined via a strict inequality, by continuity of the utility
function the correctness of the claim for all f ′ before taking the closure ofM′ implies its correctness for
all f ′ in the closure as well.
17See Footnote 16.
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p′ − (1−ε˜)·(n−1)·H
ε˜
= p′ − (1− ε˜) · ε˜ · E > p′ − (1− ε˜) · ε˜ · p ≥
≥ p′ − ε˜ · p′ = (1− ε˜) · p′ = (1− ε˜)2 · p > (1− 2ε˜) · p,
and so the payment extracted from a buyer of type v decreases by at most a mul-
tiplicative factor of (1− 2ε˜) in M′ compared to M.
To summarize, the revenue from each buyer type v ∈ EUnH decreases by at most a
multiplicative factor of (1 − 2ε˜) = (1 − ε) in M′ compared to M, and so the (overall)
revenue that M′ obtains from EUnH is at least a (1 − ε) fraction of the revenue that M
obtains from EUnH , as required.
2.5 Trimming the Expensive Part of the Menu
As outlined above, our third step toward proving Theorem 1.1, which we take in this
section, shows that in any exclusive auction over some exclusively unbounded distribution,
the expensive part of the menu can be simplified without significant loss in revenue, so that
it contains at most 2n menu entries. This step, which is the most technically elaborate
of all steps, is formalized by Lemma 2.4.
Lemma 2.4. Let n ∈ N s.t. n ≥ 2, let H ∈ R+, let ε ∈ (0, 1), and let E ≥ Max
{
n ·
H + 2, (n−1)·H+1
ε
}
. For every F ∈ ∆(EUnH) and for every E-exclusive IC and IR n-item
auction M, there exists an E-exclusive IC and IR n-item auction M′, such that both of
the following hold.
• RevM′(F ) ≥ (1− ε) · RevM(F ).
• (The set of menu entries in) M′ coincides with a subset of the set of menu entries
in M that cost at most E, with the addition of at most 2n menu entries.
Proof. Throughout the proof, we assume w.l.o.g. that each menu entry in M (with the
possible exception of (~0; 0)) is chosen by at least one buyer type v ∈ EUnH .18 For every
i ∈ [n], we define
Mi ,
{
(~x; p) ∈M ∣∣ p > E & xi > 0},
and
Wi , {v ∈ EUnH | v’s menu entry of choice from M is in Mi}.
As M is E-exclusive, we have that xj = 0 for every j ∈ [n] \ {i} and (~x; p) ∈ Mi.
Thus, Wi is the set of buyer types that choose to pay more than E, and receive in return
a positive probability for winning item i and zero probability for winning any other item.
Our goal is to apply the single-dimensional analysis of Myerson (1981) in order to replace
the plethora of menu entries in each Mi with a small constant number of menu entries.
Until noted otherwise, fix i ∈ [n] s.t. Mi 6= ∅.
We define bi , inf
{
p
∣∣ (~x; p) ∈ Mi} and si , inf{xi ∣∣ (~x; p) ∈ Mi}, and set
zi , (si,~0−i; bi). One may intuitively think of zi (charging bi for an si probability of
winning item i) as the cheapest entry, which also allocates the least probability, in Mi,
although formally (since M is not closed, and also due to the way in which Mi is
18While M is not necessarily closed after the removal of all menu entries that are not chosen by any
buyer type, it does possess a utility-maximizing entry with maximal price for every buyer type. See
Appendix B.1 for a discussion.
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defined) zi need not necessarily be in Mi.19 Our strategy is to show that, in a precise
sense, Mi behaves on Wi as follows: first allocate the buyer zi (i.e., provide a “starting
winning probability” of si for item i, and charge a “base price” of bi), and then hold
a “continuation auction” for possibly allocating some or all of the remaining (1 − si)
probability of winning item i. In this “continuation auction,” we allow the buyer to
swap zi for a different entry from Mi, paying the difference in costs and increasing the
probability of getting item i accordingly. We now make this statement precise. Until
noted otherwise, fix i ∈ [n] s.t. F (Wi) >  (and so, by definition, Mi 6= ∅) and
si < . As we will see below, we require that si < 1 in order for this “continuation
auction” to be well defined (and in fact make sense; otherwise there is no “remaining
probability” to sell) and that F (Wi) > 0 for the valuation distribution of that auction to
be well defined. As we will show, if si = 1 then |Mi| =
∣∣{zi}∣∣ = 1 (see Sublemma 2.4.4(c)
below), and so there will be no need to reduce the number of menu entries inMi in this
case (and if F (Wi) = 0, then the revenue of the original auctionM from Wi is zero, and
so we will be able to simply delete Mi from the original auction, without replacing it
with anything).
For every n-dimensional buyer type v ∈ Wi, we define the single-dimensional valuation
for the “remaining probability” of winning item i by
α(v) , vi · (1− si).
We define the corresponding single-dimensional buyer type space of our “continuation
auction” as
W 1i ,
{
α(v)
∣∣ v ∈ Wi} ⊆ R+,
and define a distribution F 1i ∈ ∆(W 1i ) ⊆ ∆(R+) over it by
F 1i (V ) , F |Wi
(
α−1(V )
)
for every measurable set V ⊆ W 1i . (Recall that F (Wi) > 0; therefore, F |Wi is well
defined.) Very roughly speaking, F 1i is defined such that its density at every v
1 ∈ W 1i can
be informally thought of as the sum of the densities of F |Wi at all v ∈ Wi s.t. α(v) = v1.
Having defined the single-dimensional buyer type space of the “continuation auction,”
we now turn to defining the (menu of the) auction itself. For an outcome (not necessarily
a menu entry in M) of the form e = (xi,~0−i; p), we define
β(e) = β(xi,~0−i; p) ,
(
xi−si
1−si ; p− bi
)
,
i.e., an entry selling a fraction of the remaining probability (1− si) so that (in addition
to the starting winning probability si) the overall winning probability is xi, in exchange
for “upping” the price (from the base price bi) to p. (Recall that si < 1; therefore, β is
well defined.) We define the “continuation auction” by20
M1i ,
{
β(e)
∣∣ e ∈Mi ∪ {zi}}.
19Nonetheless, due to the assumption that every menu entry is chosen by some buyer type, we are
able to show that zi is in the closure ofMi; see Sublemma 2.4.4(d) below. This property is heavily used
throughout our proof.
20We emphasize that we do not take the closure (see Appendix B.1 for a discussion) of M1i , as there
is no “need” to do so. Indeed, as shown by Sublemma 2.4.1(a) below, M1i already possesses a utility-
maximizing entry with maximal price for each buyer type.
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We note that M1i ∈ [0, 1] × R+ by definition of si and bi, and furthermore that (0; 0) =
β(zi) ∈ M1i ; therefore, M1i is an IC and IR 1-item auction. We now make precise
the above claim regarding Mi acting as if the buyer were allocated zi and then bid in
the single-dimension “continuation auction”M1i , thus relating the revenue of the single-
dimensional “continuation auction” M1i with that of the original auction M from Wi.
Sublemma 2.4.1 (Relation between M1i and M).
a. For every v ∈ Wi, we have that β(e) is the menu entry of choice of α(v) from M1i ,
where e ∈Mi is the menu entry of choice of v from M.
b. RevM1i (F 1i ) = RevM(F |Wi)− bi.
The proof of Sublemma 2.4.1 is given after the proof of Lemma 2.4. We note that the
only delicate part of the proof (apart from the definitions, of course) is showing that even
if zi is not an entry of Mi, then in the notation of the sublemma no buyer type chooses
zi over e (equivalently, (0; 0) over β(e)); see Sublemma 2.4.6(a) below.
Now that we have formally constructed a suitable single-dimensional auction, we
apply the celebrated theorem of Myerson (1981), to obtain a price ci ∈ R+ s.t. the
IC and IR 1-item auction M∗i ,
{
(0; 0), (1; ci)
}
maximizes the revenue from F 1i , i.e.,
RevM∗i (F 1i ) = Rev(F 1i ). Ideally, we would have now wanted to replace all entries from
Mi in M by the two entries zi = β−1
(
(0; 0)
)
and oi , (1,~0−i; ci + bi) = β−1
(
(1; ci)
)
,
however it is not clear that none of the buyer types in Wi whose utility has dropped as
a result of this replacement would not actually now choose some “cheap” entry instead,
which might cause a sharp decrease in revenue. Therefore, in order to make sure that
no buyer type has an incentive to switch to a very cheap entry, instead of replacing Mi
with {zi, oi} we replace it with {z′i, o′i}, where z′i and o′i are slightly discounted versions
of zi and oi, respectively. Formally, we define z
′
i ,
(
si,~0−i; bi − (n − 1) · H − 1
)
and
o′i ,
(
1,~0−i; ci + bi − (n− 1) ·H − 1
)
. The menu entries z′i and o
′
i sell the same winning
probabilities as zi and oi (i.e., si and 1), respectively, but with a slight (when compared
to E) additive price discount of (n− 1) ·H + 1.
Having defined the new menu entries for every i separately, we define our
“trimmed” auction:21
M′ ,
(
M∩ ([0, 1]n × [0, E])) ∪ ⋃
i∈[n]:
F (Wi)>0 &
si=1
{zi} ∪
⋃
i∈[n]:
F (Wi)>0 &
si<1
{z′i, o′i}.
We note that since M is IR, it contains the menu entry (~0; 0), and therefore so does
M′ and hence M′ is IR as well. By definition, M′ contains at most 2 expensive (i.e.,
costing more than E) items for each i ∈ [n], for a total of at most 2n expensive items,
as required. It remains to reason about the revenue of M′. To do so, we now formulate
what can be thought of as a “converse” of Sublemma 2.4.1, thus relating the revenue of
21As before, we emphasize that we do not take the closure (see Appendix B.1 for a discussion) ofM′,
as there is no “need” to do so. Indeed, M′ already possess a utility-maximizing entry with maximal
price for each buyer type except perhaps for a set of buyer types of measure zero. For buyer types
v ∈ EUnH \
⋃
i∈[n]:F (Wi)=0 or si<1Wi such an entry exists since the entry of choice of v from M is in M′
(as mentioned above, when si = 1 we have that Mi = {zi}; see Sublemma 2.4.4(c) below) and only
finitely many additional menu entries were added. For buyer types v ∈ ⋃i∈[n]:F (Wi)>0 & si<1Wi we show
in Sublemma 2.4.2(a) below that such an entry exists.
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the new trimmed auctionM′ from Wi with the revenue of the optimal single-dimensional
Myerson auction M∗i .
Sublemma 2.4.2 (Relation betweenM′ andM∗i ). Let i ∈ [n] s.t. F (Wi) > 0 and si < 1.
a. For every v ∈ Wi, the menu entry of choice of v from M′ is either o′i or z′i:
• o′i is the menu entry of choice of v from M′ iff (1; ci) is the menu entry of
choice of α(v) from M∗i .
• z′i is the menu entry of choice of v from M′ iff (0; 0) is the menu entry of
choice of α(v) from M∗i .
b. RevM′(F |Wi) = RevM∗i (F 1i ) + bi − (n− 1) ·H − 1.
The proof of Sublemma 2.4.2 is given after the proof of Lemma 2.4. As mentioned
above, the delicate part of the proof is showing that no buyer type suddenly chooses
a very cheap menu entry (or, hypothetically, an expensive menu entry from a different
“expensive part” of M′) due to the move from M with M′. Showing this strongly
depends on the assumption that every menu entry in M is chosen by some buyer type;
see Sublemma 2.4.6(b,c) below.
We now have all the pieces of the puzzle needed to show that our trimmed auction
loses no significant revenue from Wi for every i ∈ [n] s.t. si < 1. The following sublemma
shows not only that, but also that from no other part of the buyer type space, “wealthy”
or “poor”, does our trimmed auction lose significant revenue compared to the original
untrimmed auction M.
Sublemma 2.4.3 (Comparison between the Revenues of M′ and M from Restrictions
of F ).
a. For every i ∈ [n] s.t. F (Wi) > 0 and si < 1, we have that RevM′(F |Wi) ≥ (1− ε) ·
RevM(F |Wi).
b. For every i ∈ [n] s.t. F (Wi) > 0 and si = 1, we have that RevM′(F |Wi) =
RevM(F |Wi).
c. Letting P , EUnH \
⋃
i∈[n]Wi, if F (P ) > 0, then RevM′(F |P ) ≥ (1−ε) ·RevM(F |P ).
The proof of Sublemma 2.4.3 is given after the proof of Lemma 2.4. We conclude the
proof of Lemma 2.4, as by Sublemma 2.4.3 we have that
RevM′(F ) = F (P ) · RevM′(F |P ) +
n∑
i=1
F (Wi) · RevM′(F |Wi) ≥
≥ (1− ε) ·
(
F (P ) · RevM(F |P ) +
n∑
i=1
F (Wi) · RevM(F |Wi)
)
= (1− ε) · RevM(F ),
as required.
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Proof of Sublemmas 2.4.1 through 2.4.3 Before proving Sublemmas 2.4.1
through 2.4.3, we first phrase and prove three auxiliary sublemmas, which in fact encom-
pass most of the delicate details and technical complexity in the proof of Sublemmas 2.4.1
through 2.4.3.
Sublemma 2.4.4 (Properties of Mi). Let i ∈ [n] s.t. Mi 6= ∅.
a. For every e = (xi,~0−i; p) ∈ Mi and f = (yi,~0−i; q) ∈ Mi, either i) e = f , or
ii) xi < yi and p < q, or iii) xi > yi and p > q.
b. If there exists e = (xi,~0−i; p) ∈Mi s.t. xi = si (i.e., if si is attained as a minimum
rather than merely an infimum), then p = bi, i.e., zi = e and so zi ∈Mi.
c. If si = 1, then Mi = {zi}.
d. For every i ∈ [n], there exists a sequence (zmi = (smi ,~0−i; bmi ))∞m=1 ⊆ Mi
s.t. i) (smi )
∞
m=1 is weakly decreasing, ii) (b
m
i )
∞
m=1 is weakly decreasing, and
iii) limm→∞ zmi = zi = (si,~0−i, bi).
Proof. We start with Part a. If p = q, then we claim that xi = yi; indeed, assuming
w.l.o.g. that xi ≥ yi we note that if we had xi > yi, then all buyer types v with uf (v) ≥ 0
(and hence vi > 0) would have strictly preferred e to f , as the former sells (for the same
price!) a strictly larger probability for winning item i, contradicting the assumption that
each menu entry inM is chosen by at least one buyer type. If p < q, then we claim that
xi < yi; indeed, otherwise all buyer types would strictly prefer e to f since e would sell a
weakly larger probability for winning item i for a strictly lower price, contradicting the
assumption that f is chosen by at least one buyer type. Similarly, if p > q, then xi > yi.
We proceed to Part b. If there exists e = (xi,~0−i; p) ∈Mi s.t. xi = si, then for every
s = (yi,~0−i; q) ∈Mi we have by definition that yi ≥ si = xi and so by Part a that q ≥ p,
and so by definition bi ≥ p. Since e ∈ Mi, we also have by definition that bi ≤ p, and
hence bi = p. Therefore, zi = e, as required.
We proceed to Part c. Assume that si = 1 and let e = (xi,~0−i; p) ∈Mi. By definition
si ≤ xi; however, we also have that si = 1 ≥ xi, and so si = xi. By Part b, we therefore
have that e = zi. As Mi 6= ∅ by assumption, the proof of Part c is complete.
We move on to Part d. If si is attained as a minimum, then by Part b, zi ∈ Mi
and we may set zmi , zi for all m ∈ N, and so (zmi )∞m=1 trivially meets all of the desired
requirements. It remains to analyze the case in which si is not attained as a minimum
but rather only as an infimum; assume henceforth, therefore, that this is the case.
By definition of si, there exists a sequence
(
zmi = (s
m
i ,~0−i; b
m
i )
)∞
m=1
⊆Mi s.t. (smi )∞m=1
is weakly decreasing and s.t. limm→∞ smi = si. By Part a, (b
m
i )
∞
m=1 is weakly decreasing as
well. It is enough, therefore, to show that limm→∞ bmi = bi. As (b
m
i )
∞
m=1 is weakly decreas-
ing and bounded from below by bi (by definition of bi), we have that it indeed converges
and, moreover, that limm→∞ bmi ≥ bi; assume for contradiction that limm→∞ bmi > bi.
Therefore, by definition of bi there exists e = (xi,~0−i; p) ∈ Mi s.t. limm→∞ bmi > p and
so bmi > p for all m ∈ N. By Part a, we therefore have that smi > xi for all m ∈ N,
and so si ≥ xi. As by definition also si ≤ xi, we obtain that si = xi, contradicting the
assumption that si is not attained as a minimum.
Sublemma 2.4.5. Let i ∈ [n] and let e = (xi,~0−i; p) and f = (yi,~0−i; q) be two outcomes
(not necessarily menu entries inM) assigning zero probability for winning any item other
than i, s.t. xi > yi. For every v ∈ Rn+, we have that both of the following hold.
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• ue(v) ≥ uf (v) iff vi ≥ p−qxi−yi .
• uf (v) ≥ ue(v) iff p−qxi−yi ≥ vi.
Proof. ue(v) ≥ uf (v) ⇔ vi · xi − p ≥ vi · yi − q ⇔ vi · (xi − yi) ≥ p − q ⇔ vi ≥ p−qxi−yi ,
where in the last equivalence we used the fact that xi − yi > 0. The proof of the second
statement is identical, with all inequalities flipped.
Sublemma 2.4.6 (Preferences of Wi). Let i ∈ [n] s.t. Mi 6= ∅, let v ∈ Wi, and let
e ∈Mi be the menu entry of choice of v from M.
a. ue(v) ≥ uzi(v).
b. uz′i(v) > uf (v), for every f ∈M \Mi.
c. min
{
ue(v), uz′i(v)
}
> uf (v), for every outcome f of the form (yj,~0−j; q) s.t. j ∈
[n] \ {i} and q ≥ E− (n− 1) ·H − 1 (where f need not necessarily be a menu entry
in M).
Proof. Let (zmi )
∞
m=1 be as in Sublemma 2.4.4(d). We start with Part a. By definition of
e, we have that ue(v) ≥ uzmi (v) for every m ∈ N. By continuity of u, we therefore also
have that ue(v) ≥ ulimm→∞ zmi (v) = uzi(v), as required.
We turn to Part b. Denote e = (xi,~0−i; p) ∈ Mi (e is still the menu entry of choice
of v from M). If xi = si, then by Sublemma 2.4.4(b), e = zi, and the proof of Part b is
complete, as v (like any other buyer type) strictly prefers z′i to zi = e, which is the menu
entry of choice of v from M and, therefore, is weakly preferred by v to f . Otherwise,
xi > si, and so there exists N ∈ N s.t. xi > smi for every m ≥ N ; assume w.l.o.g. that
N = 1.
Denote f = (~y; q) and let f ′ , (yi,~0−i; q) (we emphasize that f ′ need not necessarily
be a menu entry in M). We claim that uzmi (v) ≥ uf ′(v) for every m ∈ N. Indeed, let
m ∈ N and let w ∈ Wi be a buyer type that chooses zmi from M. As xi > smi , by
Sublemma 2.4.5 (applied twice) we have that vi ≥ p−b
m
i
xi−smi ≥ wi. We note that s
m
i > yi.
Indeed, if q > E, then as f ∈M \Mi, we have that f ∈Mj for some j ∈ [n] \ {i}, and
so (since M is E-exclusive) yi = 0 < smi ; otherwise (i.e., if q ≤ E < bmi ), if yi ≥ smi then
we would have uf (w) = wi · yi − q > wi · smi − bmi = uzmi (w), contradicting the definition
of w. By definition, w weakly prefers zmi to f , and by definition of f
′, we have that w
(as well as all other buyer types) weakly prefers f to f ′. Therefore, w weakly prefers zmi
to f ′, and so, since vi ≥ wi and by Sublemma 2.4.5, we obtain that vi ≥ wi ≥ b
m
i −q
smi −yi .
Therefore, using Sublemma 2.4.5 once more, we have that v weakly prefers zmi to f
′, as
claimed. By continuity of u, we therefore have that uzi(v) = ulimm→∞ zmi (v) ≥ uf ′(v) as
well.
As M is IR and e ∈ Mi, we have that vi > E > H. Hence, since v ∈ EUnH we
have that vj ≤ H for every j ∈ [n] \ {i}. Therefore, uz′i(v) = uzi(v) + (n − 1) ·H + 1 ≥
uf ′(v) + (n− 1) ·H + 1 = uf (v)−
∑
j∈[n]\{i} vj · yj + (n− 1) ·H + 1 > uf (v), completing
the proof of Part b.
We conclude by proving Part c. Recall thatM is IR; therefore, we have by definition
of v that ue(v) ≥ 0, and since (~0; 0) ∈ M \Mi we also have by Part b that uz′i(v) ≥
u(~0;0)(v) = 0. Therefore, to prove Part c it suffices to show that uf (v) < 0. Indeed,
recalling that vj ≤ H, we have that uf (v) = vj ·yj−q ≤ H−q ≤ H−E+(n−1) ·H+1 =
n ·H + 1− E < 0.
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Proof of Sublemma 2.4.1. Recall that i ∈ [n] s.t. F (Wi) > 0 and si < 1. We start with
Part a. We first claim that uβ(f)
(
α(v)
)
= uf (v)−uzi(v) for every f ∈Mi∪{zi}. Indeed,
denoting f = (yi,~0−i; q), we have
uβ(f)
(
α(v)
)
= vi · (1− si) · yi−si1−si − q + bi = vi · (yi − si)− q + bi =
= (vi · yi − q)− (vi · si − bi) = uf (v)− uzi(v).
For every β(f), β(g) ∈M1i (where f, g ∈Mi ∪ {zi}), we therefore have that
uβ(f)
(
α(v)
) ≥ uβ(g)(α(v))⇔ uf (v)− uzi(v) ≥ ug(v)− uzi(v)⇔ uf (v) ≥ ug(v).
Therefore, denoting the set of utility-maximizing entries for v in Mi ∪ {zi} by M , we
have that the set of utility-maximizing entries for v in M1i is M1 ,
{
β(f) | f ∈M}. As
β is strictly monotone in the price coordinate, and since e is an entry in M with maximal
price (indeed, e is surpassed by zi neither in utility for v (by Sublemma 2.4.6(a)) nor in
price (as p ≥ bi by definition)), we have that β(e) is an entry in M1 with maximal price,
as required.
We proceed to Part b. For every v ∈ Wi, denoting the menu entry of choice of v from
M by e = (xi,~0−i; p) ∈Mi, we have by Part a that the payment thatM1i extracts from
a buyer of type α(v) is the price of β(e), which equals p− bi, i.e., precisely the payment
that M extracts from a buyer of type v, minus bi. By definition of F 1i , the proof is
therefore complete.
Proof of Sublemma 2.4.2. We start with Part a. By Sublemma 2.4.6(b), v strictly prefers
z′i to every menu entry in M\Mi (which, by Sublemma 2.4.4(c), also contains Mj for
every j ∈ [n] s.t. F (Wj) > 0 and sj = 1). By Sublemma 2.4.6(c), v strictly prefers z′i to
z′j and o
′
j for every j ∈ [n] \ {i} s.t. F (Wj) > 0 and sj < 1. Therefore, by definition of
M′, the menu entry of choice of v from M′ is either z′i or o′i. (By definition, the menu
entry of choice of α(v) from M∗i is either (0; 0) or (1; ci).) We note that
uo′i(v) = vi − ci − bi + (n− 1) ·H + 1 =
= (vi · si − bi + (n− 1) ·H + 1) + (vi · (1− si)− ci) = uz′i(v) + u(1;ci)
(
α(v)
)
,
and so v weakly (resp. strictly) prefers o′i to z
′
i iff α(v) weakly (resp. strictly) prefers (1; ci)
to (0; 0), completing the proof of Part a as the price of o′i is higher than that of z
′
i and
the price of (1; ci) is higher than that of (0; 0).
We proceed to Part b. For every v ∈ Wi, we have by Part a that the payment that
M′ extracts from a buyer of type v equals precisely the payment thatM∗i extracts from
a buyer of type α(v), plus bi− (n− 1) ·H − 1. By definition of F 1i , the proof is therefore
complete.
Proof of Sublemma 2.4.3. We start with Part a. By Sublemma 2.4.2(b), the definition of
M∗i as the revenue-maximizing auction for F 1i , and Sublemma 2.4.1(b), we have
RevM′(F |Wi) = RevM∗i (F 1i ) + bi− (n− 1) ·H− 1 ≥ RevM1i (F 1i ) + bi− (n− 1) ·H− 1 =
= RevM(F |Wi)− (n− 1) ·H − 1 ≥ RevM(F |Wi)− ε · E ≥ (1− ε) · RevM(F |Wi),
where the last inequality is since RevM(F |Wi) ≥ E by definition of Wi.
We proceed to Part b. Since si = 1, by Sublemma 2.4.4(c) we have that Mi = {zi},
and so by definition, zi is the menu entry of choice of every v ∈ Wi from M (which, by
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Sublemma 2.4.4(c), also contains Mj for every j ∈ [n] \ {i} s.t. F (Wj) > 0 and sj = 1).
As by definition zi ∈M′, it is enough to show that v strictly prefers zi to all menu entries
inM′ \M. Indeed, by Sublemma 2.4.6(c), v strictly prefers zi to both z′j and o′j for every
j ∈ [n] s.t. F (Wj) > 0 and sj < 1 (note that j 6= i since sj < 1 = si), i.e., v strictly
prefers zi to every menu entry in M′ \M, and so the proof of Part b is complete.
We conclude by proving Part c. Let v ∈ P and let e = (~x; p) ∈M be the menu entry
of choice of v from M. By definition of P and since M is E-exclusive, we have that
p ≤ E. Since by definition we have that e ∈ M∩ ([0, 1]n × [0, E]) ⊆ M′, and since the
price of every menu entry inM′ \M is at least mini∈[n]:F (Wi)>0 & si<1 bi− (n−1) ·H−1 ≥
E − (n− 1) ·H − 1, we have that the payment that M′ extracts from a buyer of type v
is either p > (1− ε) · p, or at least E − (n− 1) ·H − 1 ≥ (1− ε) ·E ≥ (1− ε) · p, and so
the proof of Part c is complete.
2.6 Discretizing the Cheap Part of the Menu
As outlined above, our fourth and final step toward proving Theorem 1.1, which we take
in this section, shows that in any auction over some exclusively unbounded distribution,
the “cheap” part of the menu can be simplified without significant loss in revenue and
without increasing the number of menu entries in the expensive part, so that (if both the
parameter H defining the exclusive unboundedness of the distribution and the parameter
E defining the cheap part of the menu are polynomial in n and 1/ε) it contains at most
(n/ε)O(n) menu entries. This step is formalized by Lemma 2.5.
Lemma 2.5. Let n ∈ N, let H ∈ R+, let E ∈ R+, and let ε ∈ (0, 1). For every
F ∈ ∆(EUnH) and for every IC and IR n-item auction M, there exists an IC and IR
n-item auction M′ such that all of the following hold.
• RevM′(F ) ≥ (1− ε) · RevM(F )− ε.
• The menu entries that cost more than (1 − ε) · E in M′ are precisely the menu
entries that cost more than E in M, each given a multiplicative price discount of
(1−ε). In particular, there are as many menu entries that cost more than (1−ε) ·E
in M′ as there are that cost more than E in M.
• There are fewer than n ·⌈n·H
ε2
+1
⌉n−1 ·⌈n·(1−ε)·E
ε2
+1
⌉
entries inM′ that cost at most
(1− ε) · E.
Proof. We start by defining an “interim” auctionM′′ that will help us define the required
auction M′. While M′′ may contain infinitely many menu entries, we show below that
w.l.o.g. only finitely many of them are in fact chosen by any buyer type; consequently,
we will derive the required auction M′ by defining it to be the auction offering precisely
these menu entries.
Let X ,
⌈
n·H
ε2
⌉
and P ,
⌈n·(1−ε)·E
ε2
⌉
. Let χ , 1/X ≤ ε2
n·H and ψ ,
(1−ε)·E
P
≤ ε2
n
. For
every δ > 0 and for every real number r ∈ R+, we denote the rounding-down of r to the
“δ-grid” by
[r]δ , δ ·
⌊
r/δ
⌋
.
We furthermore denote the coordinate-wise rounding-down of every vector ~r =
(r1, . . . , rn) ∈ Rn+ to the δ-grid by [~r]δ ,
(
[r1]δ, [r2]δ, . . . , [rn]δ
)
. We construct a new
IC and IR auction M′′ as follows:
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• For every menu entry e = (~x; p) ∈M with p ≤ E, we define p′ , (1−ε)·p (the price
of e, after a slight multiplicative discount of (1− ε)), and add the following n menu
entries to M′′: (x1, ([~x]χ)−1, [p′]ψ), (x2, ([~x]χ)−2, [p′]ψ), · · · , (xn, ([~x]χ)−n; [p′]ψ).
Each of these menu entries is a modified version of a discounted e (i.e., e with
the price modified to p′) that rounds down all but one of the allocation probabili-
ties to the χ-grid, and rounds down the (discounted) price to the ψ-grid.
• For every menu entry e = (~x; p) ∈ M with p > E, we add the menu entry (~x; p′)
to M′′, where once again p′ , (1− ε) · p. This menu entry is a discounted version
of e by the same slight multiplicative discount of (1− ε) as above (but without any
rounding).
By slight abuse of notation, we write [r]0 , r for every r ∈ R+, and [~r]0 , r for
every ~r ∈ Rn+. Using this notation, we note that every menu entry that we have added
to M′′ is of the form (xi, ([~x]χ′)−i; [(1 − ε) · p]ψ′), for some (~x; p) ∈ M, i ∈ [n], and
(χ′, ψ′) ∈ {(χ, ψ), (0, 0)}. Finally, we define M′′ to be the closure of the set of menu
entries added above to M′′.22 We note that since M is IR, it contains the menu entry
(~0; 0). Therefore (as [0]δ = 0 for every δ), M′′ also contains this menu entry, and hence
M′′ is IR as well.
We claim that RevM′′(F ) ≥ (1 − ε) · RevM(F ) − ε. Indeed, let us compare the
payments that M′′ and M extract from a buyer of each type v = (v1, . . . , vn) ∈ EUnH .
Let e = (~x; p) ∈ M be the menu entry of choice of v from M. As v ∈ EUnH , there exists
i ∈ [n] s.t. vk ≤ H for every k ∈ [n] \ {i}. Let e′ ,
(
xi, ([~x]χ′)−i; [(1− ε) · p]ψ′
) ∈ M′′ be
the menu entry inM′′ corresponding to e that does not round the allocation probability
of item i (if p ≤ E, then (χ′, ψ′) = (χ, ψ); otherwise, (χ′, ψ′) = (0, 0)). We claim that
v weakly prefers e′ to all menu entries f ′ =
(
yj, ([~y]χ′′)−j; [(1 − ε) · q]ψ′′
) ∈ M′′ with23
q < p − ε (where j ∈ [n], f = (~y; q) ∈ M, and (χ′′, ψ′′) ∈ {(χ, ψ), (0, 0)}). Indeed, we
have that
ue′(v) = vi ·xi+
∑
k∈[n]\{i}
vk · [xk]χ′− [(1−ε) ·p]ψ′ ≥
n∑
k=1
vk ·xk− (n−1) ·H ·χ′− (1−ε) ·p =
= ue(v)−(n−1)·H ·χ′+ε·p ≥ uf (v)−(n−1)·H ·χ′+ε·p =
n∑
k=1
vk·yk−q−(n−1)·H ·χ′+ε·p ≥
≥ vj · yj +
∑
k∈[n]\{j}
vk · [yk]χ′′ − [(1− ε) · q]ψ′′ − ε · q − ψ′′ − (n− 1) ·H · χ′ + ε · p =
= uf ′(v)− ε · q−ψ′′− (n− 1) ·H ·χ′+ ε · p = uf ′(v) + ε · (p− q)−ψ′′− (n− 1) ·H ·χ′ ≥
≥ uf ′(v)+ε ·(p−q)− ε2n −(n−1) · ε
2
n
= uf ′(v)+ε ·(p−q)−ε2 > uf ′(v)+ε2−ε2 = uf ′(v).
Therefore, the price of the menu entry chosen by v from M′′ is at least (1 − ε)(p −
ε) − ψ ≥ (1 − ε) · (p − ε) − ε2 = (1 − ε) · p − ε, and so the payment extracted from a
buyer of type v in M′′ compared to M decreases by at most a multiplicative factor of
(1 − ε) followed by an additive decrease of at most ε. Overall, we therefore obtain that
RevM′′(F ) ≥ (1− ε) · RevM(F )− ε, as claimed.
22As before, taking the closure ensures that a utility-maximizing entry with maximal price exists for
every buyer type. See Appendix B.1 for a more details.
23As we show weak preference and as q is defined via a strict inequality, by continuity of the utility
function the correctness of the claim for all f ′ before taking the closure ofM′′ implies its correctness for
all f ′ in the closure as well.
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As mentioned above, while M′′ may contain infinitely many menu entries, we now
show that w.l.o.g. only finitely many of these menu entries are in fact chosen by any
buyer type, and define the auction M′ to be the auction offering precisely these menu
entries. Let L ,
⋃
i∈[n]
({i} × {0, χ, 2 · χ, . . . , X · χ}[n]\{i}) × {0, ψ, 2 · ψ, . . . , P · ψ} ⊂⋃n
i=1
({i}× [0, 1][n]\{i})× [0, E]. By definition, every menu entry inM′′ that costs at most
(1 − ε) · E is of the form (xi, ~x−i; p) for some (i, ~x−i, p) ∈ L and xi ∈ [0, 1]. For every
(i, ~x−i, p) ∈ L, we set S(i,~x−i,p) ,
{
xi
∣∣ (xi, ~x−i; p) ∈M′′} ⊆ [0, 1], and if S(i,~x−i,p) 6= ∅, we
also set24 s(i,~x−i,p) , MaxS(i,~x−i,p). We define a new IC and IR auction M′ as follows:
M′ ,
{(
s(i,~x−i,p), ~x−i; p
) ∣∣∣ (i, ~x−i, p) ∈ L & S(i,~x−i,p) 6= ∅} ∪{(
~x; (1− ε) · p) ∣∣∣ (~x; p) ∈M & p > E}.
By definition, M′ is a subset of M′′, obtained by removing from M′′ only menu entries
that w.l.o.g. no buyer type chooses. (Indeed, a buyer type that chooses from M′′ some
entry (x; p) ∈ M′′ weakly prefers (s(i,~x−i,p), ~x−i; p) to (xi, ~x−i; p) = (x; p), since by defini-
tion xi ∈ S(i,~x−i,p). As both of these entries have the same price, we can assume w.l.o.g.
that this buyer type in fact chooses
(
s(i,~x−i,p), ~x−i; p
)
from M′′.) Therefore, every buyer
type chooses from M′ the same menu entry (or at least a menu entry with the same
price) as from M′′, and so RevM′(F ) = RevM′′(F ) ≥ (1− ε) · RevM(F )− ε.
We conclude the proof by noting that, as required, there are fewer than |L| = n · (X+
1)n−1 ·(P+1) = n·⌈n·H
ε2
+1
⌉n−1 ·⌈n·(1−ε)·E
ε2
+1
⌉
menu entries (not including (~0; 0)) that cost
at most (1−ε) ·E inM′, and that the menu entries that cost more than (1−ε) ·E inM′
are precisely the menu entries that cost more than E in M, each given a multiplicative
price discount of (1− ε).
2.7 Connecting the Dots
We are now ready to “connect the dots” and use Lemmas 2.2 through 2.5 to prove
Theorem 1.1, which states that C(n, ε) is finite for every number of items n ∈ N and
ε > 0, and moreover, that C(n, ε) ≤ (n/ε)O(n).
Proof of Theorem 1.1. Let n ∈ N, let ε ∈ (0, 1), and let F = F1 × · · · × Fn ∈ ∆(R+)n.
If n = 1, then by the theorem of Myerson (1981), we are done. If Maxi∈[n]Rev(Fi) =∞
(i.e., if there exists i ∈ [n] s.t. Rev(Fi) = ∞), then by the same theorem of Myerson
(1981), we are done in this case as well, as a single menu entry suffices to get arbitrarily
high revenue;25 otherwise, by Theorem 2.1, Rev(F ) <∞. If Maxi∈[n]Rev(Fi) = 0, then
the valuation of each item is 0 with probability 1 and so Rev(F ) = 0 and we are done as
well. Assume, therefore, that Maxi∈[n]Rev(Fi) ∈ (0,∞) and set ε˜ , ε/6. By scaling the
currency we assume w.l.o.g. that R , Maxi∈[n]Rev(Fi) = (1− ε˜)−5 < (6/5)5 < 5/2. (This
indeed is w.l.o.g. as our goal is to prove a multiplicative approximation.)
Let H , 2·n·(n−1)·R
ε˜
, and let E , 4·(n−1)·H
ε˜2
. By Lemma 2.2(a), F (EUnH) > 0 and so
F |EUnH is well defined. Furthermore (e.g., by Sublemma 2.2.1(a)), F (EUnH)·Rev(F |EUnH ) ≤Rev(F ) < ∞, and so, as F (EUnH) > 0, we have that Rev(F |EUnH ) < ∞. Therefore, by
definition of Rev, there exists an IC and IR n-item auction M s.t. RevM(F |EUnH ) ≥
(1 − ε˜) · Rev(F |EUnH ). By Lemma 2.3, there exists an E-exclusive IC and IR n-item
24Since M′′ is closed, S(i,~x−i,p) is compact.
25By convention, (1− ε) · ∞ =∞.
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auction M′ s.t. RevM′(F |EUnH ) ≥ (1 − ε˜) · RevM(F |EUnH ). By Lemma 2.4, there exists
an IC and IR n-item auction M′′ with at most 2n menu entries that cost more than E,
s.t. RevM′′(F |EUnH ) ≥ (1− ε˜) · RevM′(F |EUnH ). By Lemma 2.5, there exists an IC and IR
n-item auctionM′′′ with at most n · ⌈n·H
ε˜2
+ 1
⌉n−1 · ⌈n·(1−ε˜)·E
ε˜2
+ 1
⌉
menu entries that cost
at most (1 − ε˜) · E and (by definition of M′′) at most 2n menu entries that cost more
than (1− ε˜) ·E, s.t. RevM′′′(F |EUnH ) ≥ (1− ε˜) ·RevM′′(F |EUnH )− ε˜. By definition ofM′′′,M′′, M′, and M, we have that
RevM′′′(F |EUnH ) ≥ (1− ε˜) · RevM′′(F |EUnH )− ε˜ ≥ (1− ε˜)2 · RevM′(F |EUnH )− ε˜ ≥
≥ (1− ε˜)3 · RevM(F |EUnH )− ε˜ ≥ (1− ε˜)4 · Rev(F |EUnH )− ε˜ ≥ (1− ε˜)5 · Rev(F |EUnH ),
where the last inequality is since Rev(F |EUnH ) ≥ (1− ε˜) ·Rev(F ) ≥ (1− ε˜) ·R = (1− ε˜)−4
by Lemma 2.2(b). Therefore, by Lemma 2.2(c), we have that
RevM′′′(F ) ≥ (1− ε˜)6 · Rev(F ) > (1− 6 · ε˜) · Rev(F ) = (1− ε) · Rev(F ).
We conclude the proof by noting that the number of menu entries (not including
(~0; 0)) in M′′′ is less than
n ·
⌈
n ·H
ε˜2
+ 1
⌉n−1
·
⌈
n · (1− ε˜) · E
ε˜2
+ 1
⌉
+ 2n =
n ·
⌈
2 · n2 · (n− 1) ·R
ε˜3
+ 1
⌉n−1
·
⌈
8 · n2 · (n− 1)2 · (1− ε˜) ·R
ε˜5
+ 1
⌉
+ 2n ≤
n ·
⌈
5 · n2 · (n− 1)
ε˜3
+ 1
⌉n−1
·
⌈
20 · n2 · (n− 1)2 · (1− ε˜)
ε˜5
+ 1
⌉
+ 2n ≤ (n/ε)O(n).
We note that, as mentioned in Section 1, it is possible to strengthen the upper bound
on C(n, ε) from (n/ε)O(n) to (logn/ε)O(n), but at a cost of a messier presentation. As this
stronger bound is still exponential in n, we have decided not to present the more involved
proof for this bound. Nonetheless, we comment that the only change required to prove
this stronger bound is to Lemma 2.5, where by following along the same lines as the proof
above (i.e., discretizing each cheap menu entry n times, each time rounding-down all but
one allocation probability, etc.), but utilizing discretization techniques of Hart and Nisan
(2013) and Dughmi et al. (2014) to round to a more carefully chosen grid, one may show
an improved upper bound for the number of menu entries into which it is possible to
discretize the cheap part of the menu in Lemma 2.5. (Note that other than for the cheap
part of the menu, the remaining lemmas show that we only need at most 2n more entries
for the expensive part of the menu, and therefore no modification is required to these
lemmas, which either way contain most of the conceptual and technical “beef” of the
proof, in order to show the stronger upper bound.)
2.8 Arbitrary Exclusively Unbounded Type Distributions
We emphasize once more that in contrast to the first step (Lemma 2.2) of the proof
of Theorem 1.1, the remaining three steps (i.e., Lemmas 2.3 through 2.5) hold for any
exclusively unbounded type distribution, and not merely for one obtained by conditioning
product distributions upon EUnH . Therefore, these steps allow us to derive results also
for such distributions. Indeed, a proof similar to that of Theorem 1.1 (only without using
Lemma 2.2) yields:
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Proposition 2.6. For every n ∈ N, H ∈ R+, and ε > 0, there exists C = C(n,H, ε) ≤(
n·H
ε
)O(n)
such that for every (possibly even highly correlated) F ∈ ∆(EUnH), we have that
RevC(F ) ≥ (1− ε) · Rev(F )− ε.
Proposition 2.6 states that a menu size of
(
n·H
ε
)O(n)
guarantees a multiplicative ap-
proximation of at least (1−ε) for the revenue from any exclusively unbounded distribution
(e.g., in particular from any distribution over R+× [1, H]n−1), thereby generalizing a sim-
ilar result by Hart and Nisan (2013) that shows the same upper bound of
(
n·H
ε
)O(n)
, but
only for distributions where the valuations of all items are bounded (i.e., distributions
over [1, H]n). We note that Dughmi et al. (2014) (following Hart and Nisan, 2013, who
showed this for two items) improve the upper bound that Hart and Nisan (2013) show
for distributions over [1, H]n to
(
logn+logH
ε
)O(n)
. Similarly to the discussion concluding
Section 2.7 (using the techniques of Hart and Nisan, 2013, and Dughmi et al., 2014, in
precisely the same way), the upper bound in Proposition 2.6 can be improved to the same
upper bound of
(
logn+logH
ε
)O(n)
, therefore generalizing also the result of Dughmi et al.
(2014) from bounded to exclusively unbounded valuations.
Finally, we note that an exclusively unbounded valuation space is essentially the
maximal valuation space for which a result along the lines of Proposition 2.6 can be
shown, since Hart and Nisan (2013) show that for two items with unbounded valuations
(and as a result, for any number of items where the valuations of at least two items are
unbounded), no finite menu size can guarantee any fixed fraction of the optimal revenue.
Proposition 2.6 therefore shows that the use of distributions where the valuations of the
two items grow arbitrarily large together (like the distribution used in the proof of Hart
and Nisan, 2013) cannot be avoided in any proof of this impossibility result.
3 A Small Menu for Item Pricing
In this section, we prove Theorem 1.3, which states that for every ε > 0, there exists
d = d(ε) such that for every number of items n ∈ N and F1, F2, . . . , Fn ∈ ∆(R+), we have
for C = nd that RevC(F1 × · · · × Fn) ≥ (1 − ε) · SRev(F1 × · · · × Fn). Concretely, we
show that the theorem holds for d ≤ O(ε−5).
Definition 3.1 (SRev). Let n ∈ N be a number of items and let F = F1×F2×· · ·×Fn ∈
∆(R+)n be a product distribution over Rn+. We denote the (expected) revenue obtainable
from F by selling each of the n items separately via a revenue-maximizing auction by
SRev(F ) = SRev(F1 × F2 × · · · × Fn) ,
n∑
i=1
Rev(Fi).
Remark 3.1. By the theorem of Myerson (1981), the menu size (not including (~0; 0)) of
the auction obtaining revenue SRev(F ) by selling each of the n items separately via a
revenue-maximizing auction is at most 2n − 1.
The main idea underlying the proof of Theorem 1.3, which we give in full detail below,
is that instead of holding n separate auctions (one for each item), which may result in
an exponential-size menu, we hold exponentially fewer separate auctions, which result in
a polynomial-size menu. Recall that for every item i, by the theorem of Myerson (1981),
the optimal separate-selling revenueRev(Fi) can be obtained via a take-it-or-leave-it offer
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for selling item i (with probability 1) for a certain price ci. Let pi be the probability item
i is sold (if it is offered for the price ci). The separate auctions that we perform are as
follows:
• For each item for which ci is very small (say, at most an ε/n fraction) compared to
SRev(F ), the optimal (separate-selling) revenue Rev(Fi) is very small compared
to SRev(F ) as well, and therefore the sum of the optimal revenues from all of these
items is small compared to SRev(F ). Therefore, we allow ourselves to not sell any
of these items at all (or alternatively, give them to the buyer for free).
• For each item for which ci is very large (say, by at least a factor of n/ε) compared
to Rev(Fi), the probability that the item is sold (when selling items separately)
is small. Hence, the probability that two or more of these items are sold is small.
Therefore, we can afford to allow the buyer to buy at most only one of these items
(for the same price ci as when selling each item separately) without incurring a
significant loss in revenue. We therefore offer the buyer at most n + 1 choices for
these items.
• We partition the remaining items (those with “nonextreme” values of ci) into
O(log n) many bundles, each to be offered (via a separate auction) to the buyer
at a take-it-or-leave-it price described below, where the ratio between the (optimal
separate-selling) prices of any two items in a single bundle is small. Moreover, we
show that this can be done s.t. each such bundle has
∑
pi either very large or very
small.
– For each bundle with
∑
pi very large, we show that the buyer’s valuation of
the bundle is tightly concentrated, allowing us to extract almost all of this
valuation by offering the bundle for a price slightly below the expectation of
this valuation.
– For each bundle with
∑
pi very small, not unlike the case of the high-costing
items above, we show that the probability of two or more of the items in the
bundle being sold (when selling separately) is small. Since the prices of all of
these items are similar, instead of allowing the buyer to buy at most one of
these items (for its separate-selling price ci) as in the case of the high-costing
items above (thereby offering as many choices to the buyer for these items
as there are items in the bundle), we simply offer the entire bundle for the
cheapest (optimal separate-selling) price of any of the items in the bundle. We
can afford to do so without incurring a significant loss in revenue since all of
the items in the bundle have similar prices.
As each of these O(log n) many bundles is offered via a take-it-or-leave-it price, we
offer the buyer altogether at most poly(n) choices for (buying any subset of) these
bundles.
Proof of Theorem 1.3. Let ε ∈ (0, 1). We prove the theorem for26 d , 8194/ε5, and note
that the auction that we construct is deterministic.
Let n ∈ N, and let F = F1 × F2 × · · · × Fn ∈ ∆(R+)n. For every i ∈ [n], denote
by ri , Rev(Fi) the maximal revenue obtainable from Fi. By definition, SRev(F ) =
26The following constant multiplier is used for ease of presentation, and is far from tight.
25
SRev(F1 × · · · × Fn) =
∑n
i=1 ri. If n = 1, then by Remark 3.1 we are done, as selling the
single item “separately” (and obtaining revenue SRev(F )) requires at most 1 = nd menu
entry (not including (~0; 0)). If 2 ≤ n < 4/ε, then we are similarly done, as selling each
item separately (and obtaining revenue SRev(F )) requires at most 2n − 1 < n4/ε < nd
menu entries. Assume henceforth, therefore, that n ≥ 4/ε. If Maxi∈[n] ri =∞, i.e., if there
exists i ∈ [n] s.t. ri =∞, then we are done as well, as by the theorem of Myerson (1981) a
single menu entry suffices to get arbitrarily high revenue.27 If Maxi∈[n] ri = 0, then there
is nothing to prove. Assume, therefore, that Maxi∈[n] ri ∈ (0,∞). By scaling the currency
we assume w.l.o.g. that Maxi∈[n] ri = 1. (This indeed is w.l.o.g. as our goal is to prove a
multiplicative approximation.) Therefore, SRev(F ) ≥ 1 (and also SRev(F ) ≤ n).
For every i ∈ [n], by the theorem of Myerson (1981), the revenue ri can be obtained
from Fi via a take-it-or-leave-it offer for selling item i (with probability 1) for a certain
price ci. Let pi , Pvi∼Fi
[
vi ≥ ci
]
be the probability that ci is accepted. We note that
ri = pi · ci. As outlined above, instead of holding n separate auctions (one for each item),
which may result in an exponential-size menu, we hold exponentially fewer separate
auctions, which results in a polynomial-size menu. To describe these separate auctions,
we first partition the n items into buckets based on the optimal price ci for each item
i ∈ [n], and then describe the separate auction that we hold for the items in each bucket.
Set ε˜ , ε/4.
• The low bucket L includes all items i ∈ [n] for which ci < ε˜/n.
• The high bucket H includes all items i ∈ [n] for which ci ≥ n/ε˜.
• Let m , ⌈log1+ε˜ n/ε˜⌉. We partition the remaining items (i.e., the items that are
not already in the low or the high bucket) into 2m regular buckets, where the ratio
of any two prices in each bucket is less than 1 + ε˜. Specifically, for each integer
−m ≤ b < m, regular bucket Bb includes all items i ∈ [n] \ (L ∪ H) such that
(1 + ε˜)b ≤ ci < (1 + ε˜)b+1.
We now construct our auction by describing the separate auction that we hold for the
items in each bucket. (As the buyer’s valuation is additive, holding a compound auction
comprised of a number of separate IC and IR auctions for pairwise-disjoint sets of items
is itself IC and IR.)
• We bundle all of the items in the low bucket L together, and give this bundle to
the buyer for free. (Alternatively, we could give any predefined subset of the low
bucket to the buyer for free.)
• For the high bucket H, we offer the buyer the option of purchasing at most one of
the items i ∈ H (to be chosen by the buyer), for the price ci of that item.
• For a regular bucket Bb, we define µb ,
∑
i∈Bb pB. We say that Bb is dense if
µb > ε˜
−3.
– If Bb is dense, then we bundle all of the items in the bucket Bb together, and
offer this bundle to the buyer for a take-it-or-leave-it price of (1−ε˜)·µb ·(1+ε˜)b.
27As already noted above, by convention, (1− ε) · ∞ =∞.
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– Otherwise, i.e., if Bb is not dense, we partition the bucket Bb into bundles
B1b , B
2
b , . . ., s.t. for each such bundle B
j
b and for each i ∈ Bjb , we have that∑
k∈Bjb\{i} pk ≤ ε˜. We offer each such bundle, separately, to the buyer for a
take-it-or-leave-it price of (1 + ε˜)b. (Thus, the auction for the items in the
bucket Bb is itself comprised of a number of separate auctions, one for each
bundle.) By Lemma 3.1 (see below, after this proof; the lemma is applied after
scaling by ε˜), we have that no more than
⌈
ε˜−4
⌉
such bundles are needed when
partitioning the bucket Bb.
Altogether, the number of bundles of items from regular buckets that are offered to
the buyer in (separate) take-it-or-leave-it auctions is at most∣∣∣{b ∈ [−m,m− 1] ∩ Z ∣∣ µb > ε˜−3}∣∣∣+ ⌈ε˜−4⌉ · ∣∣∣{b ∈ [−m,m− 1] ∩ Z ∣∣ µb ≤ ε˜−3}∣∣∣ ≤
≤ ⌈ε˜−4⌉ · 2m = 2 · ⌈ε˜−4⌉ · ⌈log1+ε˜ n/ε˜⌉ = 2 · ⌈ε˜−4⌉ · ⌈ log2 n+ log2(1/ε˜)log2(1 + ε˜)
⌉
≤
≤ 2 · (ε˜−4 + 1) · (2 · log2 n
ε˜
+ 1
)
≤ 4 · ε˜−4 · 2 · log2 n
ε˜
= log2 n · 8/ε˜5.
Therefore, recalling that ε˜ = ε/4, the total number of menu entries in the compound
auction (comprised of the separate auctions held for each low, high, or regular bucket, as
described above) is less than
1 · (|H|+ 1) · 2log2 n·8/ε˜5 = (|H|+ 1) · n8/ε˜5 ≤ (n+ 1) · n8/ε˜5 < n8/ε˜5+2 = n8192/ε5+2 < nd.
It remains to analyze the revenue from the compound auction, which is, by linearity
of expectation, the sum of the revenues from the separate auctions held for each of the
buckets.
• The revenue from the auction held for the low bucket L is obviously 0. (Note
that had each item from L been sold separately, the revenue would have been∑
i∈L ri ≤
∑
i∈L ci <
∑
i∈L ε˜/n ≤ ε˜, and so the loss in revenue is at most an additive
ε˜.)
• We claim that the revenue from the auction held for the high bucket H is at least
(1− ε˜) ·∑i∈H ri. To show this, we note that if the buyer values exactly one item
i ∈ H by at least ci, then this item is sold. As for every j ∈ H \ {i} we have
that rj ≤ 1 by normalization and that cj ≥ n/ε˜ by definition of H, we obtain that
pj = rj/cj ≥ ε˜/n. Thus, item i is sold with probability at least
pi ·
(
1−
∑
j∈H\{i}
pj
) ≥ pi · (1− (n− 1) · ε˜/n) > (1− ε˜) · pi.
Therefore, the (expected) revenue from the auction held for the high bucket is∑
i∈H
Pv∼F
[
item i is sold
] · ci >∑
i∈H
(1− ε˜) · pi · ci = (1− ε˜) ·
∑
i∈H
ri.
(Note that had each item from H been sold separately, the revenue would have
been
∑
i∈H ri, and so the loss in revenue is at most a multiplicative (1− ε˜) factor.)
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• We claim that the revenue from the auction held for a dense regular bucket Bb is at
least (1− ε˜)3 ·∑i∈Bb ri. As the price for which we offer the bundle of all of items in
this bucket is (1− ε˜) · µb · (1 + ε˜)b, it suffices to show that this bundle is sold with
probability at least (1− ε˜), as this implies that the revenue from this auction is at
least
(1−ε˜)·(1−ε˜)·µb·(1+ε˜)b = (1−ε˜)2·
∑
i∈Bb
pi·(1+ε˜)b > (1−ε˜)3·
∑
i∈Bb
pi·ci = (1−ε˜)3·
∑
i∈Bb
ri.
For every i ∈ Bb, let Xi be an indicator random variable for the buyer valuing item
i by at least ci, and so Xi is a Bernoulli variable taking value 1 with probability
pi. Let X ,
∑
i∈bXi and note that the expectation of X is µb > ε˜
−3. Clearly, if
X ≥ (1− ε˜) ·µb, then the buyer values the bundle by at least (1− ε˜) ·µb ·mini∈Bb ci ≥
(1− ε˜) · µb · (1 + ε˜)b, and the bundle is sold. To show that the bundle is sold with
probability at least (1−ε˜), it therefore suffices to show that Pv∼F
[
X<(1−ε˜)·µb
] ≤ ε˜.
Denoting the standard deviation of X by σb, since (Xi)i∈Bb are independent we have
that σb =
√∑
i∈Bb pi · (1− pi) ≤
√
µb. By Chebyshev’s inequality, we therefore
have that
Pv∼F
[
X<(1− ε˜) · µb
] ≤ Pv∼F [X<µb − (ε˜√µb) · σb] ≤ 1
ε˜2 · µb < ε˜
−2 · ε˜3 = ε˜,
as required. (Note that had each item from Bb been sold separately, the revenue
would have been
∑
i∈Bb ri, and so the loss in revenue is at most a multiplicative
(1− ε˜)3 factor, where the triple loss of (1− ε˜) is due once to lower-bounding ci by
(1 + ε˜)b, a second time to multiplying the requested price by (1 − ε˜) in order to
guarantee a sale with high probability, and a third time to the ε˜ probability of not
selling the bundle.)
• Finally, we claim that the revenue from the auction held for a bundle Bjb from a
nondense regular bucket Bb is at least (1 − ε˜)2 ·
∑
i∈Bjb ri. As the price that we
charge for this bundle is no more than the value of ci for any item i ∈ Bjb in the
bundle, we note that, in particular, the bundle is sold if the buyer values some item
i ∈ Bjb by at least ci. Therefore, the probability that this bundle is sold is at least
the probability that the buyer values exactly one of the items i ∈ Bjb by at least ci,
which, by definition of Bjb , is at least
∑
i∈Bjb pi ·
(
1−∑k∈Bjb\{i} pk) ≥ (1−ε˜)·∑i∈Bjb pi.
Therefore, the revenue from this auction is at least
(1− ε˜) · (∑
i∈Bji
pi
) · (1 + ε˜)b > (1− ε˜)2 ·∑
i∈Bjb
pi · ci = (1− ε˜)2 ·
∑
i∈Bjb
ri.
(Note that had each item from Bjb been sold separately, the revenue would have
been
∑
i∈Bjb ri, and so the loss in revenue is at most a multiplicative (1− ε˜)
2 factor,
where the double loss of (1− ε˜) is due once to lower-bounding ci by (1 + ε˜)b, and a
second time to the ε˜ probability of not selling the bundle.)
The total revenue is, therefore, at least
(1− ε˜) · (∑
i∈H
ri
)
+ (1− ε˜)3 · ( ∑
i∈Bb:
µb>ε˜
−3
ri
)
+ (1− ε˜)2 · ( ∑
i∈Bb:
µb≤ε˜−3
ri
) ≥ (1− ε˜)3 · ( ∑
i∈[n]\L
ri
) ≥
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≥ (1−ε˜)3 ·(SRev(F )−ε˜) ≥ (1−ε˜)4 ·SRev(F ) > (1−4·ε˜)·SRev(F ) = (1−ε)·SRev(F ),
as required.
Lemma 3.1. Let m ∈ R+, let p1, p2, . . . , pm ∈ R be strictly positive numbers, and let
s ,
∑m
i=1 pi. There exists a partition of [m] into at most dse sets Bj, s.t. for every set
Bj in the partition, and for every index i ∈ Bj, we have that ∑k∈Bj\{i} pk ≤ 1.
Proof. We prove the claim by induction over dse. We note that the constraint on each
set Bj is equivalent to demanding that
∑
k∈Bj\{i} pk ≤ 1 for i ∈ arg mink∈Bj pk.
Assume w.l.o.g. that p1 ≥ p2 ≥ · · · ≥ pm and let ` , Max
{
` ∈ {0, 1, . . . ,m −
1} ∣∣ ∑`k=1 pk ≤ 1} ∈ {0, 1, . . . ,m − 1}. We define B1 , [` + 1] ⊆ [m]. By monotonicity
of (pk)
m
k=1, we have that i , ` + 1 ∈ arg mink∈B1 pk, and by definition of `, we have
that
∑
k∈B1\{i} pk ≤ 1. If ` = m − 1 (and so i = m), then we are done. Otherwise,
by definition, of ` we have that
∑
k∈B1 pk =
∑`+1
k=1 pk > 1 (and hence dse > 1), and so⌈∑
k∈[m]\B1 pk
⌉ ≤ dse − 1. Therefore, by the induction hypothesis, the proof is complete
as [m] \B1 can be partitioned into at most dse − 1 sets Bj for j ≥ 2 s.t. for every set Bj
in the partition and for every i ∈ Bj, we have that ∑k∈Bj\{i} pk ≤ 1.
We conclude by noting that in Lemma 3.1, the bound of dse on the number of sets in
the partition is in fact tight. This can be demonstrated by setting m = 2 · dse − 1, and
setting p1 , p2 , · · · , pm−1 , 1/2+ ε and pm , s−
∑m−1
k=1 pk, for ε > 0 sufficiently small
s.t. pm > 0. Indeed, no set B
j that contains two of the indices 1, . . . ,m− 1 may contain
any other index without violating the constraint of the lemma.
4 Lower Bound on
Revenue-Approximation Complexity
In this section, we prove Theorem 1.5, which states that C(n, 1/n) ≥ 2Ω(n). We consider
the simple distribution where the value of each item is (independently) either 0 or 1, each
with probability 50%. Thus, the buyer is interested in (i.e., has value > 0 for the items
in) a random subset of the items (where each subset is chosen with probability exactly
2−n), and has value 1 for each item in this subset. A revenue-maximizing auction for
this setting offers each item, separately, for a take-it-or-leave-it price of 1; viewed as a
menu, this auction has a menu entry for each nonempty bundle of items ∅ 6= S ⊆ [n],
which sells this bundle S for a price of |S|. This auction clearly maximizes the revenue,
as it extracts the full social welfare (i.e., expected sum of item valuations), which is n/2,
as revenue. An alternative auction, which has only a single menu entry, sells the whole
bundle for a price that is slightly less than n/2, so that with high probability the size of
the set of desired items is at least this price (in which case the bundle is sold). Choosing
the price to be n/2 − ω(√n) is required in order for the probability of selling the bundle
to be subconstant. Therefore, this simple auction loses (about) a 1√
n
fraction of the
revenue. In the proof below, we show that such a 1/nc loss of revenue is necessary in every
simple-enough auction, i.e., in every auction having subexponentially many menu entries.
Before proceeding to the proof, we roughly sketch the intuition underlying it. Consider
an auction that loses less than, say, a 1
10n
fraction of the revenue. This means that for
most of the 2n possible bundles of desired items, the payment extracted from a buyer
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interested in (precisely the items in) that bundle must be higher than the bundle size
minus 1/2. Let us say that a buyer type that is interested in (precisely the items in) a
bundle S pays full price if the auction extracts a payment higher than |S| − 1/2 from
a buyer of this type. The basic idea is that, roughly speaking, if a buyer type that is
interested in a bundle S pays full price, then this buyer type “should” have a menu entry
“for itself” that allocates S for a price close to |S|. The reason is that two buyer types
interested in bundles of different sizes cannot both choose the same entry and both pay
full price (as the buyer type interested in the smaller-sized bundle would not want to buy
at the “full price” of the other buyer). We note that it is true that buyer types interested
in identically sized bundles T 6= S can still “share” the same menu entry and both pay full
price; indeed, this can happen if the entry that they both choose allocates the union S∪T
for a price close to |S| = |T |. This, however, would imply that a buyer type interested
in S ∪ T does not pay full price, since this menu entry already offers a discount for the
bundle S ∪ T . Our proof formalizes this intuition: if “too many” buyer types pay full
price and choose the same menu entry (which must be the case with a small menu that
extracts almost all of the revenue), then we show that buyer types interested in many
subsets or their union cannot pay full price, leading to a significant loss in revenue.
Proof of Theorem 1.5. We will prove that C
(
n, 1
10n
)
> 2n/10. We note that this implies
the theorem, as C
(
10n, 1
10n
) ≥ C(n, 1
10n
)
, which can be seen by fixing the value of 9n
of the 10n items to 0 with probability 1. Let n ∈ N (throughout the proof, we will add
requirements for n to be large enough to accommodate certain conditions). As stated
above, we focus on the product distribution F ∈ ∆(R+)n, where the value of each of
the n items is either 0 or 1, each independently with probability 50%.28 Assume for
contradiction that there exists an IC and IR auction that has at most 2n/10 menu entries,
but that obtains from F a revenue of at least
(
1− 1
10n
) · Rev(F ) = (1− 1
10n
) · n/2.
For each set of items S ⊆ [n], we identify S with the buyer type valuing each item in
S by 1 and each item not in S by 0. We say that a buyer type S ⊆ [n] pays full price
if the payment extracted from a buyer of this type is strictly higher than |S| − 1/2. Our
strategy is to define a certain distribution over pairs of buyer types (where the set of items
associated with the first buyer type is contained in the one associated with the second,
i.e., the first buyer type is interested in a subset of the items that interest the second),
and reach a contradiction by showing that the probability that both of these buyer types
pay full price should on the one hand be large due to the assumption of a slight revenue
loss, but on the other hand be small due to the assumption of a small menu size (recall
the informal discussion preceding the proof, roughly explaining why two buyer types that
are interested in two sets ordered by inclusion and that are both paying full price must
“usually” choose distinct menu entries). We begin by defining this distribution over pairs
of buyer types.
Construction We choose two buyer types (sets of items) S0, S1 at random as follows:
we first choose a set of items uniformly at random among all 2n sets, and then choose a
random item i ∈ [n] and take the symmetric difference of the first set with {i} to obtain
a second set. Thus, exactly one of the two chosen sets contains the element i, while the
two sets are identical in their containment of all other items. Let us denote the set that
28So, we in fact prove the theorem by showing that C
(
10n, 110n
)
> 2(10n)/100 by focusing on a product
distribution over 10n items, where 9n of the items have value 0 with probability 1, and each of the
remaining n items has value either 0 or 1, each independently with probability 50%.
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does not contain i by S0, and the set that contains i by S1. We note that while the
distributions of each of S0 and S1 are not uniform (e.g., the expected size of S0 is
n−1
2
and of S1 is
n+1
2
, while the expected size of a uniformly chosen set is n/2), it is nonetheless
the case that the probability that any of these distributions gives to any event is at most
twice the probability that the uniform distribution gives to the same event (since the
average of the probabilities given to this event by the distributions of S0 and of S1 is
exactly that given by the uniform distribution).
Lower Bound We lower-bound the probability that both buyer types S0 and S1 pay full
price by using the union bound. We first note that at most 1/10 of the buyer types S ⊆ [n]
do not pay full price; otherwise, the revenue loss due to all such buyer types would have
been higher than an additive 1
20
, i.e., higher than a 1
10n
fraction of the maximal revenue,
contradicting the assumption that the given auction loses at most a 1
10n
fraction of the
maximal revenue. Next, notice that before the labeling, each of S0 and S1 was uniformly
distributed among all possible 2n buyer types. Therefore, for each one of the (unlabeled)
buyer types, the probability that it does not pay full price is at most 1/10. Hence, taking
the union bound, the probability that at least one of the (unlabeled) buyer types does not
pay full price is at most 1/5, and so the probability that both pay full price is at least 4/5.
Following the strategy outlined above, we will reach a contradiction by showing that this
probability need in fact be less than 4/5 when taking into account the assumption that
the given auction has a small menu size.
Upper Bound The derivation of an upper bound on the probability that both buyer
types S0 and S1 pay full price is more subtle. Consider the following way of obtaining
the exact same distribution for (S0, S1): first, S0 is chosen according to the marginal
distribution on it, and then S1 is obtained by adding a random item i 6∈ S0 (uniformly
chosen from all items not in S0) to S0.
In our derivation of the upper bound, we condition upon whether the menu entry
chosen by S0 is chosen by “many” buyer types that pay full price. Formally, let us say
that a menu entry from the given auction is tiny if at most 20.8n buyer types that pay
full price choose this entry. Our upper bound on the probability that both buyer types
S0 and S1 pay full price will be the sum of the probability that S0 pays full price and
chooses a tiny menu entry (which is obviously not smaller than the probability that S0
and S1 both pay full price, and S0 chooses a tiny menu entry) and the probability that
S1 pays full price, conditioned upon S0 paying full price and not choosing a tiny menu
entry (which is obviously not smaller than the probability that S0 and S1 both pay full
price, and S0 does not choose a tiny menu entry). We now estimate each of these two
probabilities.
Since there are at most 2n/10 menu entries in the given auction, the total number of
buyer types that pay full price and choose a tiny menu entry is at most 20.9n. Thus,
the probability that S0 pays full price and chooses a tiny menu entry is at most 2 · 20.9n2n
(by the above observation that the probability of any event for S0 is at most twice the
probability of that event for a uniform set), i.e., this probability decreases exponentially
with n.
Following the strategy outlined above, we proceed to upper-bound the probability
that S1 pays full price, conditioned upon S0 paying full price and not choosing a tiny
menu entry. Assume, therefore, that S0 pays full price but chooses some nontiny menu
entry e. We consider the probabilities with which e allocates each of the items. By IR,
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every item that is contained in every set that (as a buyer type) pays full price and chooses
e must be allocated by e with probability strictly greater than 1/2 (since if, for some buyer
type S ⊆ [n], even a single item i ∈ S is allocated by e with probability at most 1/2, then
S would receive negative utility from paying strictly more than |S| − 1/2 for e). Let U be
the set of items that are allocated with probability strictly greater than 1/2 by e. Since e
is not tiny, there are more than 20.8n buyer types S that pay full price and choose it, and
so |U | > 0.8n (since the total number of subsets of U is at most 2|U |.)
We now come to the crux of our argument. Consider a set T that is contained in
U , but is a proper superset of one of the sets (buyer types) S ⊆ [n] that pay full price
and choose e. By IC, we claim that T cannot be paying full price in the given auction.
Indeed, e already offers buyer type T utility strictly greater than 1/2 (since the utility
of T from e is greater by strictly more than 1/2 than the utility of buyer type S from e,
which by IR is nonnegative), and a buyer that pays full price has, by definition, utility
strictly less than 1/2.
Since S1 is a strict superset of S0, and since S0 chooses e and pays full price, we
therefore have that if S1 ⊆ U , then S1 does not pay full price. Therefore, the probability
that S1 is not contained in U is an upper bound on the probability that S1 pays full
price (when both are conditioned upon S0 paying full price and not choosing a tiny menu
entry). Recall that in our “second way” of obtaining the distribution for (S0, S1), the set
S1 is obtained by adding a random item i 6∈ S0 (uniformly chosen from all items not in
S0) to S0. For any S0, the probability that i 6∈ U is thus at most n−|U |n−|S0| < 0.2nn−|S0| , and since
the probability that |S0| > 0.6n (i.e., that 0.2nn−|S0| > 1/2) decreases exponentially with n
(even after conditioning upon S0 paying full price and not choosing a tiny menu entry
29),
we get that conditioned upon S0 paying full price and not choosing a tiny menu entry,
the probability that S1 pays full price is, for large enough n, at most, say, 3/5.
Contradiction Following the strategy outlined above, we can now upper-bound the
probability that both S0 and S1 pay full price, by summing the probability that S0 pays
full price and chooses a tiny menu entry (which decreases exponentially with n) and the
probability that S1 pays full price conditioned upon S0 paying full price and not choosing
a tiny menu entry (which we upper-bounded by 3/5 for large enough n). Summing these
two probabilities, for large enough n, we get strictly less than 4/5, which is the lower
bound computed above for the probability of the same event — a contradiction.
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A Menu Size and Communication Complexity
One may view the menu size of an auction is as exactly characterizing its (deterministic)
communication complexity. To see this easy correspondence, we should first carefully
define the communication complexity. In the communication complexity scenario, we
have a commonly known mechanism (in the intended application it may be determined
by the commonly known distributions F1, . . . , Fn on item values). Our single buyer also
has a privately known valuation, and the seller has no private knowledge. The auction
is just a function that maps the buyer’s valuation to the allocation and payment for this
valuation.
Definition A.1 (Deterministic Communication Complexity). The deterministic com-
munication complexity of a given auction is the minimal number of bits that must be
exchanged, in the worst case, by the buyer and seller in order for both of them to compute
the allocation and payment for the buyer’s valuation.
We can immediately notice that since the seller has no private information, then
the buyer may simulate him completely, and thus there is never any need for the seller
to transmit anything. It follows that without loss of generality, the communication is
one-sided: the buyer transmits some information about his valuation, which suffices to
determine the outcome of the auction (allocation and payment). Thus, if some (prefix
free) communication protocol for the auction uses at most c bits of communication, then
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there are at most 2c possible outcomes, i.e., the menu size of the auction is at most
2c. Conversely, if the auction has a menu-size of C, then clearly the buyer need only
transmit her chosen menu entry, which requires dlog2Ce bits of information. We have
thus observed the following.
Proposition A.1. The deterministic communication complexity of an auction is exactly
the logarithm (base 2, rounded up) of the menu size of the auction.
Note also that once the auction is incentive compatible, this characterization of the
communication complexity holds whether or not the communication protocol is required
to be incentive compatible: the lower bound on the communication complexity applies
even without any incentive requirements, while the upper bound protocol is clearly in-
centive compatible.
The definition of randomized communication complexity may be more subtle: one
definition would just require a randomized protocol that computes, with high probabil-
ity, the required outcome. A more natural definition, however, would just require the
distribution of the outcomes of the protocol to be that specified by the auction.
Definition A.2 (Randomized Communication Complexity). The randomized communi-
cation complexity of an auction is the expected number of bits of communication required,
for the worst case input, in a randomized protocol whose probability of allocating each
item and whose expected payment are as specified by the auction.
As it turns out, this definition of randomized communication complexity is a much
easier benchmark to satisfy, at least as long as we allow “public coins” (i.e., as long as
we assume that the buyer and seller share a randomly generated string, whose length is
not counted toward the communication). For instance, one may in fact implement any
single-item auction with a single bit of communication under a public-coin model. By a
theorem of Myerson (1981), an IC single-item auction is completely specified by 1) the
probability of allocation x(v) for every value v, where x(·) is a nondecreasing function, and
2) the payment p0 of a buyer with valuation 0. Suppose that the buyer and seller choose
(jointly, without any communication cost) a price p at random so that x(p) is exactly
uniform on [0, 1]. To get the correct allocation, it suffices for the buyer to get the item
if v ≥ p (requiring one bit of communication), which indeed happens with probability
exactly x(v). If we charge the buyer exactly p+ p0 when she gets the item and p0 when
she does not get the item, then the expected payment turns out to be as required.
It is not completely clear to us how large the public-coin randomized complexity can
be in the case of multiple items, nor is it clear how large the private-coin randomized
complexity can be.
B Technical Notes
B.1 Infinite Menus
B.1.1 Utility-Maximizing Entries
As is well known in the literature, by the taxation principle every (single-buyer) IC
auction with finitely many possible outcomes can be identified with a finite menu of
possible choices for the buyer (where by IC the buyer chooses an entry that maximizes
her utility), and vice versa. For IC auctions with infinitely many possible outcomes,
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while it is still true that each such auction can be identified with an (infinite) menu of
possible choices for the buyer, it is no longer the case that every such menu defines some
IC auction. Indeed, in a general infinite menu, a utility-maximizing entry for each buyer
type does not necessarily exist, yet in menus corresponding to IC auctions, such an entry
always exists. We note that one way to make sure that a (possibly infinite) menu that we
construct indeed defines an IC auction is to make sure that this menu is closed (as a subset
of [0, 1]n×R+). (This is the technique employed in our proofs of Lemmas 2.3 and 2.5.30)
Indeed, for a buyer type v = (v1, . . . , vn) ∈ Rn+, all nonnegative-utility entries from a
closed menuM lie in the compact setM∩
(
[0, 1]n × [0,∑ni=1 vi]), and by continuity of
the utility function, this function attains a maximum value in this compact set.
B.1.2 Tie-Breaking by Prices
Definition 2.4(a), which is the standard definition of the revenue obtainable by an IC
auction, specifies that ties (in utility) between menu entries are broken in favor of higher
prices. We note that even if, in some menu, a utility-maximizing menu entry exists
for some buyer type (or for all buyer types), then it is not guaranteed that a utility-
maximizing entry with maximal price (among all utility-maximizing entries) exists for this
buyer type. (I.e., it is not guaranteed that the supremum price over all utility-maximizing
entries for this buyer type is attained as a maximum.) Indeed, to be completely general,
a more subtle definition of the revenue obtainable by an IC auction would have been
needed (taking, roughly speaking, the supremum revenue over all tie-breaking rules), and
even under such a definition, the menu entry of choice of a specific buyer type would not
have been well defined (or would have become a limit of menu entries), making reasoning
about such auctions quite cumbersome. Nonetheless, similarly to above, if an IC auction
has a closed menu, then it possesses, for each buyer type, a utility-maximizing entry
with maximal price, and so the revenue is well defined by Definition 2.4(a), without the
need for a more subtle definition. Indeed, the set of utility-maximizing entries from a
given closed menu for a given buyer type is (by the reasoning given in Appendix B.1.1) a
compact set; therefore, it contains an entry with maximum price. The only point in the
proofs in this paper where we do not explicitly construct an auction by specifying its menu
is in the proof of Theorem 1.1, where we start with an IC (and IR) auction (possibly of
infinite size) that obtains revenue close to Rev(F ); to justify the fact that we can assume
w.l.o.g. that the menu of such an auction is closed, we note that if some menu entry e
is weakly preferred by some buyer type v to all menu entries in some menu M, then by
continuity of the utility function, e is weakly preferred by v also to all menu entries in
the M — the closure of M (in [0, 1]n × R+). Therefore, given an IC auction M that
obtains revenue R from a distribution F under some tie-breaking rule, we have that M,
under price-maximization tie-breaking (which is well defined since M is closed), obtains
revenue at least R from F .
B.2 Arbitrary Tie-Breaking
As discussed above, the (standard) definition that we use for the revenue obtainable
by a given IC auction (Definition 2.4(a)) depends on tie-breaking being performed in
favor of higher prices. Nonetheless, we emphasize that the definition of the revenue
30The reasoning in our proof of Lemma 2.4 is more delicate and is detailed in that proof.
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obtainable from a given distribution F , whether constrained by the menu size (i.e., RevC)
or unconstrained (i.e., Rev), does not depend on the tie-breaking rule. Indeed, if an
auctionM obtains revenue R w.r.t. tie-breaking in favor of high prices, then for arbitrarily
small ε > 0, multiplying the price of each menu entry in M by (1 − ε) and taking the
closure of the resulting menu (equivalently, multiplying the price of each menu entry inM
by (1−ε)), yields an auction with the same menu size (since a finite menu is always closed)
that obtains revenue at least (1 − ε) · R w.r.t. any tie-breaking rule (since multiplying
each price by (1 − ε) breaks ties in favor of higher-priced menu entries, and can only
cause a buyer type to “jump” to even higher-costing menu entries). As the definitions of
RevC and Rev therefore do not depend on the tie-breaking rule, our results hold for any
tie-breaking rules, e.g., even tie-breaking in favor of low prices in the definition of RevC
and in favor of high prices in the definition of Rev.
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